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SHOULD WE ALL BE WELFARE 
ECONOMISTS? 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION · 
On what normative foundation should the edifice of law and public 
policy be built? What are proper grounds for claims of individual 
right, and how, generally, do those grounds relate to considerations of 
individual well-being and social welfare? 
In this Essay, I argue that individual well-being and a related 
concept of social welfare should be important considerations in the 
design of legal rules, but not the exclusive ones. When the notion of 
well-being receives substantive content, the most plausible and attrac­
tive definitions all allow a distinction between what will best promote 
a person's well-being and what that person might rationally judge to 
be most choice-worthy,1 typically in light of a moral or aesthetic ideal. 
This distinction is important. Once it is recognized that the greatest 
possible well-being is not what everyone necessarily values most, the 
notion that public policy should be based exclusively on social welfare 
- defined as an increasing function of the well-being of individuals -
loses plausibility. It becomes important to explore the relationship be­
tween well-being and other values and to ask what else people might 
rationally value,2 sometimes more than their own well-being, and why. 
In the answers to these questions lie the foundations of rights. 
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. B.A. 1975, J.D. 1 980,Yale. - Ed. I am 
grateful to a number of friends and colleagues who have commented on previous drafts, in­
cluding Scott Brewer, Allen Ferrell, Christine Jolls, Greg Keating, Howell Jackson, Louis 
Kaplow, Dan Meltzer, Frank Michelman, Fred Schauer, Steve Shavell, and Bill Stuntz, as 
well as participants in a workshop at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Mark 
Freeman and Kevin Walsh provided valuable research assistance. 
1. See Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., The Status of Well-Being, in 19 THE TANNER LECTURES 
ON HUMAN VALUES 93, 98 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1998) (distinguishing well-being 
from "choiceworthiness"); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of che Behavioral 
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 329 (1977) [hereinafter Sen, 
Racional Fools] (discussing "commitment" to causes or ideals as a basis for choice that 
"drives a wedge between personal choice and personal welfare"). 
2. Claims about what people "rationally value" could refer either (strongly) to what ra­
tionality commands that they value or (weakly) to what it would not be irrational for them to 
value. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 200 (1986) (" 'Rational' may mean 
either rationally required or rationally acceptable."). In references to what people rationally 
value or in any comparable formulation that is preceded by a conditional verb such as 
"might" or "could," or by "can," I intend to invoke the weaker understanding. 
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Althougn this Essay ultimately confronts very large questions, I 
begin with a narrower focus, furnished by my colleagues Louis Kaplow 
and Steven Shavell in their important book Fairness Versus Welfare.3 
In that book, Kaplow and Shavell argue that legal rules should be 
based exclusively on calculations involving the "well-being" or 
"utility" of "individuals. "4 (They use the terms "well-being" and 
"util ity" interchangeably,5 as I shall do in the remainder of this Essay, 
and refer recurrently to "individuals," apparently to emphasize that 
social welfare is an increasing function of individual well-being.6) 
Intending their book partly as a contribution to moral and political 
philosophy,7 Kaplow and Shavell imply that there are no moral rights 
not directly founded on considerations of individual well-being. In the 
legal domain, constitutional law furnishes an especially instructive test 
case for their theory's implications and attractiveness. If accepted, 
Kaplow and. Shavell's argument would support recognition only of 
rights that tend to be util ity-maximizing,8 or otherwise to promote 
overall social welfare, at least insofar as past decisions do not 
determine judicial rulings.9 Their thesis rejects the foundational as­
sumption of much constitutional doctrine and scholarship that people 
have moral rights that are not all contingently grounded in utility func­
t ions.10 
3. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE {2002). 
4. See id. at xvii ("Our thesis is that social decisions should be based exclusively on their 
effects on the welfare of individuals - and, accordingly, should not depend on notions of 
fairness, justice, or cognate concepts."). 
5. See. e.g., id. at 18 (equating utility and well-being). 
6. See, e.g., id. at 24 ("Under the rubric of welfare economics, the conception of social 
welfare is based on individuals' well-being."). 
· 
7. See id. at xvii-xviii ("[O]ur subject is not limited to the law but rather concerns the 
most general questions of social policymaking . . . .  "). 
8. Their position reflects a form of what is sometimes called "rule utilitarianism," which 
"holds that we should not judge the rightness of [an] act by its consequences but by the 
consequences of adopting the rule under which the particular act falls." JOHN HOSPERS, AN 
INTRODUCl"ION TO PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 608 {2d ed. 1967). Rule utilitarianism thus 
differs from act utilitarianism, which calls for case-by-case calculations of how utility could 
best be promoted. Although act utilitarianism is not consistent with the recognition of 
meaningful constitutional rights, rule utilitarianism could support a robust regime of rights 
- though only of rights that would tend to promote utility, without regard to any other 
value. 
9. Kaplow and Shavell suggest that judges should generally employ welfare economic 
analysis insofar as they have "policymaking discretion," but recognize that judges "are also 
constrained by rules of procedure, statutes, precedent, and the Constitution." KAPLOW & 
SHA YELL. supra note 3, at 397. 
10. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of 
Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 352-60 (1993) (arguing that rights reflect interests, some of 
which are interests in well-being, but some of which are agency and dignitary interests not 
reducible to well-being). I do not mean to imply that Kaplow and Shavell leave no place for 
rights; they do contemplate rights predicated on calculations of social utility. Nor do I wish 
to claim that moral and constitutional rights are never best explained by reference to inter-
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For several reasons·; Kaplow and Sha veil's challenge deserves close 
consideration. The first involves their stature as scholars. Kaplow and 
Shavell are prominent figures in the field of law and economics.11 In 
preparing this book, they have forayed deeply into political theory and 
moral philosophy,12 as well as a number of areas of substantive law. In 
light of their stature, their views have a serious claim to attention. A 
second reason lies in the barbed character of their arguments, many of 
them aimed "to convince legal policy analysts". to alter their research 
agendas.13 In essence, Kaplow and Shavell argue that all law professors 
(and possibly all political theorists and moral philosophers) will be 
wasting their time at best, and rendering pernicious advice at worst,14 
until they embrace Kaplow and Shavell's preferred version of welfare 
economics. 15 
The third reason that Kaplow and Shaven deserve attention in­
volves their substantive arguments. Their main affirmative argument is 
familiar: rational parties who did not know what role they would 
occupy in society would choose to be governed by whatever rules 
would produce the highest average utility,16 with some additional 
ests in promoting well-being; some rights are best explained in this way. But I do mean to 
claim, contrary to Kaplow and Shavell, that there are some rights that reflect values or 
interests other than well-being and that have some power to resist appeals to a purported 
overriding interest in promoting social welfare. 
1 1 . See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 
39 J.L. & ECON. 191 (1996); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Accuracy in the Determination 
of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between 
Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63 (1999); Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and 
Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness 
Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 1 10 YALE L.J. 237 (2000); 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic 
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Should Legal 
Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000). 
12. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at xviii (noting that they address questions 
that "have engaged philosophers from Aristotle to Hume and Kant, to Ross and Hare and 
Rawls"). 
13. Id. at 472. Kaplow and Shavell repeatedly castigate "analysts" who advocate atten­
tion to considerations of justice and fairness for failing to state their positions clearly and for 
failing to meet other standards of argumen�tive rigor. See, e.g. , id. at 45 (asserting that "[i]t 
is frequently difficult to ascertain what analysts mean when they discuss the fairness of legal 
rules" because "(a)nalysts often use words like 'fairness' without defining them"): hi. at 470 
(criticizing proponents of fairness for failing to meet the "basic test" of stating their princi­
ples with precision). 
14. See id. at 383 (maintaining that analysis that relies on notions of fairness tends 
"generally to be counterproductive"). 
15. See id. at 472 (arguing that all those who analyze legal policy issues should employ a 
welfare economic framework). 
16. For an earlier argument that rational parties would choose the rule structure yield­
ing the highest average utility, see John Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational 
Behavior, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 45-46 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams 
eds., 1982). 
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weight possibly attached to the well-being of the worst-off class.17 By 
contrast, their main negative argument is fresh18 and, at first blush, 
daunting. According to them, there are easily imaginable situations in 
which any legal rule not based exclusively on considerations of indi­
vidual well-being would make literally all affected parties worse-off 
than they would be under a utility-maximizing rule.19 By design, rights­
based theories will sometimes leave some people worse-off than they 
would have been under a utility-maximizing regime; the point of such 
theories is to protect individual rights against the claims of social wel­
fare.20 But Kaplow and Shavell expect the recognition that rights might 
diminish literally everybody's well-being to dissolve the appeal of 
rights-based theories.21 Why, after all, would anyone favor a theory 
that threatens to make everyone worse-off?22 
17. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 440-43 {defending the welfare economic 
approach as reflective of what rational persons, ex ante, would consent to). 
Although Kaplow and Shavell insist that rational ex ante contractors would be con­
cerned solely with promoting utility, they acknowledge that questions of fair distribution can 
still arise. They note two possible approaches to distributive issues that would be consistent 
with welfare economics, but decline to take a stand concerning which is preferable: 
[U)nder the utilitarian approach, social welfare is taken to be the sum of individuals' utili­
ties(, and how utility is distributed among individuals is considered normatively irrelevant]. 
Alternatively, the well-being of worse-off individuals might be given additional weight . . .  . 
In this book we do not defend any specific way of aggregating individuals' well-being . . .  . 
Rather. we argue, in essence, that legal policy analysis should be guided by reference to 
some coherent way of aggregating individuals' well-being . . . .  
Id. at 27. 
18. It  builds, however, on earlier writing by Amartya Sen noting that it is logically 
impossible to be a "Pareto libertarian," or to hold simultaneously (i) that one situation is 
always preferable to another when it makes everyone better-off and no one worse-off and 
(ii) that people have rights that cannot permissibility be sacrificed in order to increase social 
well-being. See AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970); 
Amartya Sen, liberty, Unanimity and Rights, 43 ECONOMETRICA 217 (1976); Amartya Sen, 
Personal Utilities and Public Judgments: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?, 89 
ECON. J. 537 {1979) [hereinafter Sen, Personal Utilities}. 
19. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at xviii, 52. 
20. See, e.g. , RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xi (1975) (defining 
rights as "political trumps" capable of overriding the promotion of "collective goal[s]"). 
21. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at xviii-xix {"Most individuals - including 
many of the philosophers we have queried - would not readily endorse a principle of fair­
ness if doing so implies (as it does) that it may be deemed socially good to make everyone 
worse-off."). 
22. Against the bare possibility of rights-protecting rules that make everyone worse-off, 
a rights theorist may of course protest that her particular theory would not have that conse­
quence. According to Kaplow and Shaven, this protest affords no escape, for reasons 
involving logical consistency. See ill. at 468 ("[l]f one embraces any notion of fairness, logical 
consistency implies that one has thereby endorsed the view that adopting a legal rule that 
makes everyone worse-off may well be good."). A rights theorist necessarily accepts the 
principle that rights can sometimes prevail over considerations of welfare or utility, and if 
this principle is a good one, then it ought to apply even in situations in which its application 
would reduce everyone's well-being. If a theorist blanches from this conclusion, this reaction 
suggests that she really does not accept the principle on which rights-based theories neces-
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I begin in Part I by accepting that question as framed. The short 
answer is that nearly everything depends on how "well-being" and 
being "better-off" are defined. At some points Kaplow and Shaven 
appear to assume that each person's well-being is defined by her per­
sonal rank ordering of possible states of affairs: a person is better-off 
insofar as she occupies a state of affairs that she rationally prefers to 
another state of affairs. Even if Kaplow and Shaven employed that 
definition consistently, their arguments would not be wholly persua­
sive. In imaginable cases, a society would behave wrongly if it created 
a state of affairs in which every living member regarded herself as 
better-off, but did so without regard to the implications for future 
generations whose values and preferences are not yet formed.23 
Imagine, for example, a society in which everyone prefers intellectual 
and spiritual tranquility to a state of affairs in which freedoms of 
speech and religion are recognized, precisely because those freedoms 
might tend to subvert tranquility. Each would willingly trade her free­
dom to unsettle others for an enforceable prohibition against others 
roiling her, even though many would be unwilling unilaterally to 
forego practices that might disturb others in the absence of legal 
regulation and the assurance of reciprocity that it provides. Even in 
such a case, what people contingently prefer (taken for the moment as 
the measure of each's well-being) is not the exclusive measure of 
choice-worthiness or what the Jaw ought to be. 
To begin with, the interests of future generations need to be con­
sidered24 - people as yet unborn, whose values and preferences are 
likely to be shaped by the environment in which they are raised.25 
Even if every living member of a society thought otherwise, it would 
be wrong (from what I shall describe in Part III  as an "impersonal" 
moral standpoint) to deny future generations the background condi­
tions necessary to develop a critical and self-critical perspective on 
prevailing patterns of thought, ambition, and belief. More generally, 
thought about future generations drives a wedge between what people 
value or prefer, on the one hand, and what they have reason to value 
or prefer, on the other. As I shall argue in Part III, moral argument is 
ultimately argument about the force of reasons. 
sarily rest - that principles of individual right are sometimes independent of and more im­
portant than considerations of individual and social welfare. See icl. at 56. 
23. See generally JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES JN THE SUBVERSION OF 
RATIONALITY 109-40 (1983) (discussing "adaptive preference formation" and arguing that 
social policy should not be based solely on wants or preferences, independent of considera­
tion of whether those wants or preferences were autonomously formed and are ethically de­
fensible) . 
24. For discussion of the interests of unborn generations, see infra notes 1 68-169 and 
accompanying text. 
25. See, e.g., GARY s. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 16 (1996) (noting that 
"[c]ulture exercises a sizable influence over preferences"). 
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Admittedly, however, cases in which rights-based theories would 
call for overriding literally everyone's preferences are the most diffi­
cult, testing ones for their defenders. If Kaplow and Shavell could sus­
tain the equation of each person's well-being with that person's 
ranked preferences, and if rights-based theories regularly called for 
overriding everyone's preferences, then such theories would be diffi­
cult to defend. But Kaplow and Shaven cannot consistently equate 
each person's well-being with each's individual preference order 
among possible states of affairs. The equation dissolves when they 
move from their negative argument against rights-based theories to 
their positive argument in favor of welfare economics. 
As defined and championed by Kaplow and Shaven, welfare eco­
nomics requires interpersonal comparisons of utility.26 On a narrow 
view of the limits of economic analysis, economists can identify policy 
changes that would make everyone better-off, but possess no distinc­
tive capacity to make value judgments about the desirability of actions 
that would make some people better-off while diminishing the well­
being of others (unless well-being is implausibly equated solely with 
money or wealth or otherwise measured by reference to an imagined 
market in which the components of well-being are assigned a dollar 
value ).27 Kaplow and Shavell are more normatively ambitious. When 
some people are made better-off and others worse-off, Kaplow and 
Shaven insist that we need to make quantitative assessments, com­
paring the gains in well-being of the winners with the losses of the 
losers. But interpersonal comparisons are impossible without a sub­
stantive definition of well-being as a specific good or package of goods 
that each person possesses in measurable quantities - for example, 
one that equates well-being with an experiential state such as happi­
ness, or with the overall satisfaction of desires over a lifetime, or with 
the possession of objectively valuable goods and opportunities. As I 
shall argue at length, once well-being is given the kind of substantive 
definition necessary to support meaningful interpersonal comparisons, 
26. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 24 n.1 5 ("Implicit in any social welfare 
function is a comparison of, and a way of trading off, different individuals' utilities."). 
27. Richard Posner once championed the equation of social welfare with wealth maxi­
mization. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical a11d Political Basis of the Efficie11cy Norm i11 
Common Law Distrib11tio11, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 ( 1980); Richard A. Posner, 
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) [hereinafter 
Posner, Utilitarianism]. This approach calls for increases and decreases in personal well­
being to be measured by assigned prices, reflecting people's willingness to pay either to 
achieve or to avoid particular outcomes. See Posner, Utilitarianism, supra. As Posner has 
subsequently recognized, however, this approach is morally unattractive, because it makes 
well-being "dependent on the assignment of property rights and . . .  on the distribution of 
wealth across persons." Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A 
Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS Of TORT LAW 99-100 (David 
Owen ed., 1 995). Kaplow and Shavell expressly reject the idea that individual well-being and 
social welfare could be measured solely in terms of wealth. See KAPLOW & SHA VELL, supra 
note 3, at 35-36. 
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a conceptual gap emerges between well-being and what everyone nec­
essarily values most. On the most plausible substantive accounts, 
each of us might sometimes value other things more than our own 
well-being (as thus defined and measured). For example, we might 
rationally value moral or aesthetic ideals more than any experiential 
state, such as happiness,28 or more than the maximal satisfaction of our 
changing desires over the course of our lives. 
Part I also develops an important implication of the argument that 
well-being - once given the kind of substantive definition that 
welfare economics requires - is not necessarily what each of us values 
most. Kaplow and Shavell rightly argue that a theory that weighs con­
siderations other than well-being could dictate results that reduce 
everyone's well-being. But their welfare economic approach invites a 
symmetrical objection: if people can rationally value freedoms or 
ideals more than their own well-being, then a theory that only consid­
ers well-being could imaginably mandate the imposition of legal rules 
that literally no one would choose. 
Part II contests Kaplow and Shavell's argument that if people did 
not know what positions they would occupy in society, they would 
always choose legal rules based on their own anticipated well-being. 
Part I I  also challenges the assumption that imagined ex ante contracts 
can always provide adequate justification for particular legal rules, 
even when the contingently surrounding rule structure could not be 
similarly justified. 
Finally, Part III  sketches the affirmative theory that is presupposed 
by many of my criticisms in Parts I and II. Building on earlier observa­
tions, I explain when and why well-being matters in moral and legal 
decisionmaking, but why other values sometimes matter more from 
both a personal and a moral point of view. As Kaplow and Shavell 
emphasize, some moral and legal rights have as their purpose the 
promotion of human well-being. But Part III argues that other values 
help to support other rights. Freedoms of speech and religion, in par­
ticular, reflect the insight that well-being is not all that we have reason 
to value, nor always what we have reason to value most. Part III  also 
argues that reasons, not well-being or utility, are the ultimate currency 
of moral argument. 
I should say a word at the outset about how my general approach 
and conclusions compare with those of Kaplow and Shaven. Kaplow 
and Shaven launch their sharpest attacks against moral theories that 
purport to eschew appeal to consequences of any kind.29 Like them, I 
28. As I explain in Part I I I, the realization of moral ideals may contribute to happiness 
and well-being, but need not always do so, and in any event is not typically sought for the 
sake of well-being. See infra notes 137-154 and accompanying text. 
29. They furnish a particularly dramatic example, involving retributive theories of pun­
ishment. As portrayed by Kaplow and Shavell, retributivists believe that punishment should 
always match the severity of the predicate crime. See KAPLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 3, at 
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am deeply skeptical of such theories. Indeed, I regard many of their 
attacks on legal scholarship that presupposes the validity of such 
theories as entirely convincing, even brilliant. I differ, however, in 
denying that the only consequences that matter morally are conse­
quences for human well-being, once the concept of well-being is sub­
stantively defined. 
I. WELL-BEING: A CONCEPT IN SEARCH OF A DE FINITION 
At the heart of Kaplow and Shavell's argument lies a definitional 
contrast between fairness or rights-based theories, on one hand, and 
welfare economics on the other.30 In assessing legal rules, welfare eco­
nomics, which Kaplow and Shaven commend, appeals only to consid­
erations of individual well-being;31 it regards social welfare as an 
increasing function of individual well-being.32 By contrast, they define 
fairness or rights-based theories, which they condemn, as theories that 
give weight to considerations other than individual well-being.33 
According to Kaplow and Shavell, such theories err grievously by 
threatening to diminish the well-being of literally everyone.34 
Kaplow and Shaven expect all to agree that a policy would be 
indefensible if it reduced everyone's well-being.35 This anticipated 
agreement depends on a crucial assumption that everyone values well­
being above all else. Upon reflection, however, it seems plain that 
whether everyone would attach this priority to being well-off, or the 
corresponding disvalue to being less well-off, depends on what well-
302. Retributivists believe that the imposition of a more severe sanction would violate the 
rights of the person being punished, even if the more severe penalty would have an 
overwhelmingly successful deterrent effect. Indeed, Kaplow and Shavell assert, a consistent 
retributivist would think it wrong for a legal system to establish a penalty that was dispropor­
tionate to the severity of the underlying crime, even if the higher threatened sanction would 
wholly eliminate commission of the crime and thus obviate the need for any punishment at 
all. See icl. at 31 1 -13, 329-31 .  
30. See id. at 3 (framing this contrast). 
31.  See id. at 5 ("[A]dvocating the exclusive use of welfare economics, as we do, is 
equivalent to adopting the moral position that the design of the legal system should depend 
solely on concerns for human welfare."); id. at 1 6  ("The hallmark of welfare economics is 
that policies are assessed exclusively in terms of their effects on the well-being of individu­
als."). 
32. See hi. at 24 ("(S]ocial welfare is postulated to be an increasing function of individu­
als' well-being."). 
33. See id. at 28 ("IO]ur definition of notions of fairness includes all principles - but 
only those principles - that give weight to factors that are independent of individuals' well­
being."): id. at 39 ("Notions of fairness have the property that evaluations relying on them 
are not based exclusively - and sometimes are not dependent at all - on how legal policies 
affect individuals' well-being." (emphasis omitted)). 
34. See id. at 52-58 (developing this argument). 
35. See id. at 468-69 ("[W]e suspect that the fact that any notion of fairness may involve 
making everyone worse off will be seen as troubling."). 
February 2003] Welfare Economics 987 
being is or what it means to say that everyone is better or worse-off. 
To illustrate the point, suppose I stipulate that well-being consists of 
having money,36 then argue that no one could reasonably support a 
rule that would diminish everyone's monetary wealth, because such a 
rule would make everyone worse-off. This argument would fail. If 
well-being were defined as having money, people might sometimes 
value other things more than an increment of well-being - freedom of 
speech or religion, for example, or leisure, or cleaner air. Before we 
can judge the value of well-being, we need to know what well-being is. 
Here, however, a methodological challenge arises. Well-being is 
not a concept with clear, pre-existing boundaries. The literature 
abounds with rival definitions.37 To assess the claim that public policy 
should be based solely on considerations of well-being, it is necessary 
to consider two sets of questions. First, how do Kaplow and Shaven 
define well-being, and is it plausible to think that law and public policy 
should be based solely on well-being as they define it? Second, what 
would be the best or most perspicuous account of well-being, and what 
role should this conception play in the design of public policy? 
In this Part, I am mostly concerned with how Kaplow and Shaven 
define well-being and with whether well-being, as thus defined, is nec­
essarily what everyone would value most. I deal more extensively with 
the second question, involving the most perspicuous account of well­
being and its relation to other values, in Part III. 
A. The Looseness of Kaplow and Shave/l's Definition 
Surprisingly, in a book arguing that legal rules should be based 
exclusively on considerations of well-being - and one repeatedly 
excoriating fairness theorists for failing to define their terms precisely38 
36. The equation of well-being with money would reHect a crude caricature of the equa· 
tion of social welfare with wealth, defined to include not only money but other goods capa­
ble of being assigned monetary prices. Cf supra note 28 (discussing the measurement of 
well-being). 
37. See infra notes 60-76 and accompanying text (discussing conceptions of well-being 
prominent in the literature). As indicated by these disputes, "well-being" occupies the cate­
gory of "essentially contestable concepts." See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contestable Concepts, 
56 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 1 67, 1 67-68 ( 1956) (using this terminology to 
describe concepts that are at once evaluative and descriptive and have sufficiently diverse 
criteria of application that no single, preferred definition can be extracted merely from 
examination of ordinary usage); see also WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF 
POLITICAL D ISCOURSE 10-44 (2d ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1983) (1974) (discussing essen­
tially contested concepts). 
38. See KAPLOW & SHA VELL. supra note 3, at 45 (asserting that "[i]t is frequently diffi­
cult to ascertain what analysts mean when they discuss the fairness of legal rules" because 
"[a]nalysts often use words like 'fairness' without defining them"); id. at 470 (criticizing pro­
ponents of fairness for failing to meet the "basic test" of stating their principles with preci­
sion). 
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- Kaplow and Shavell give no clear account of what well-being is.39 
They come closest to offering a definition on pages 18-19: 
The notion of well-being used in welfare economics ... incorporates in a 
positive way everything that an individual might value - goods and 
services that the individual can consume, social and environmental 
amenities, personally held notions of fulfillment, sympathetic feelings for 
others, and so forth .... The only limit on what is included in well-being 
is to be found in the minds of individuals themselves, not in the minds of 
analysts.40 
This formulation leaves open as much as it resolves. Although it 
says that well-being "incorporates . . . everything that an individual 
might value," it fails to specify how well-being does so. It suggests that 
well-being is somehow relative to individuals, or resides in the minds 
of individuals, but does not say what well-being is or by what states of 
mind it should be measured. 
The looseness of Kaplow and Shavell's definition proves important 
when, not having pinned themselves down, they subsequently make 
arguments that presuppose two very different, and ultimately incom­
patible, measures of well-being. Their negative arguments against 
rights-based moral theories presuppose what I shall term an "ordinal" 
definition of well-being.41 Under an ordinal definition, a person's well­
being depends entirely on her subjective ranking of the state of affairs 
that she occupies, relative to other possible states of affairs, regardless 
of the subjective basis for her preferences.42 But Kaplow and Shaven 
make other arguments presupposing what I shall call a "substantive" 
theory of well-being. In particular, they argue that decisionmakers 
must make interpersonal comparisons of utility,43 in order to deter­
mine, for example, whether one person's gain in well-being is large 
enough to compensate for another's loss. As I shall explain, 
interpersonal comparisons are impossible unless well-being is capable 
of cardinal or quantitative - not merely ordinal - measurement. 
More particularly, interpersonal comparisons require a substantive 
39. In principle, Kaplow and Shavell recognize the importance of having well-being 
clearly defined. See id. at 16 (noting "the central importance of the concept of well-being to 
welfare economics"); id. at 409 (asserting that "understanding the meaning and breadth of 
the concept of individuals' well-being is of central importance"). 
40. Id. at 18-1 9. 
41. See, e.g., id. at 30 n.27 (asserting that people are made worse-off when "given less of 
those things that they value more than the analyst does and more of those things that they 
value less than the analyst does"). 
42. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS. ECONOMICS 83 n.3 (16th ed. 
1998) ("A statement such as 'Situation A is preferred to Situation B' - which does not re­
quire that we know how much A is preferred to B - is called ordinal, or dimensionless. 
Ordinal variables are ones that we can rank in order, but for which there is no measure of 
the quantitative difference between the situations."). 
43. See id. at 24 n.1 5. 
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definition of well-being, as a particular good or package of goods that 
each person possesses in varying, comparable quantities. 
Confusion results from using the single term "well-being" to 
encompass these different ordinal and substantive notions. The power 
of Kaplow and Shavell's arguments against fairness theories arises 
from their implicit reliance on an ordinal conception of well-being: if 
everyone would rank state of affairs A as better than state of affairs B, 
it is hard to defend a fairness theory that would mandate B rather than 
A. But the welfare economic analysis that they champion requires a 
substantive conception of well-being, not an ordinal one.44 What is 
more, a substantive conception must equate well-being with a par­
ticular good or package of goods - despite the possibility that the 
maximum attainment of that good or package of goods is not what 
every person, in her ordinal rankings, would value most. In other 
words, each person's ordinal rankings of her own well-being might 
reflect standards of valuation not captured by a transpersonal substan­
tive conception of well-being - such as Kaplow and Shavell's welfare 
economic analysis requires - that equates well-being with a 
particular good or package of goods. 
1. The Inadequacy of an "Ordinal" Account of Well-Being 
Under an ordinal measure, each person's well-being is defined by 
her ranked preferences for certain states of affairs over others.45 If a 
person prefers state of affairs A to state of affairs B, then her well­
being is increased by a move from B to A, regardless of the grounds 
for her preference. Certain passages in Fairness Versus Welfare sug­
gest that Kaplow and Shaven mean to define well-being in just this 
substantively empty way.46 
44. Their version is thus an ambitious one, in both its positive and its normative dimen­
sions. Cf SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS. supra note 42. at 83 (noting that "[e]conomists today 
generally reject the notion of a cardinal, measurable utility" and conduct only the more lim­
ited types of analyses permitted by ordinal measures of well-being). 
45. Economists commonly assume that such a preference order can be constructed "by 
first imposing rationality axioms on the decisionmaker's preferences and then analyzing the 
consequences of these preferences for her choice behavior." ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL.. 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 5 (1995). An alternative approach "treats the individual's choice 
behavior as the primitive feature and proceeds by making assumptions directly concerning 
this behavior." Id.; see also KEN BINMORE. GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
VOLUME I: PLAYING FAIR 105-06 ( 1994) (noting that under a revealed preference approach 
"[o]ne observes some of the choices that a player makes and then argues that he is making 
choices as though he were equipped with a preference relation"); AMARTYA SEN, 
COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 12-13 (1999) [hereinafter SEN. COMMODITIES] (observ­
ing that the equation of utility with a choice function is common "in the modern economic 
literature" and "goes back at least to the origin of the 'revealed preference' school" in a 1 938 
article by Paul Samuelson). 
46. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 19 n.8 (suggesting that well-being 
should be defined in terms of "what the individuals under consideration really care about"); 
id. at 58 ("(I]t is virtually a tautology to assert that fairness-based evaluation entails some 
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As I noted in the Introduction, even if Kaplow and Shaven consis­
tently defined well-being in this way, it would be a mistake to conclude 
that a legal rule that reduced everyone's well-being (as thus defined) 
should always be deemed morally unacceptable. To reach this conclu­
sion, some admittedly peculiar cases need to be considered, because it 
is hard to imagine how a rule dispreferred by literally everybody might 
ever get implemented. But the question retains its interest as one of 
moral right or wrong: even if every living person in a particular society 
preferred state of affairs A to state of affairs B, could it ever be said, 
from a detached or impersonal moral perspective, that A is morally 
worse? To this question, for reasons that I shall explain more fully in 
Part III, I believe the answer to be yes. Among the pertinent consid­
erations are how existing preferences were formed and whether 
decent opportunities existed for critical and self-critical reflection.47 In 
the Introduction, I thus imagined a society in which every living 
person would willingly· trade her freedoms of speech and religion for 
the social and psychological tranquility expected to ensue from an 
enforced orthodoxy. Despite the imagined consensus that free speech 
would make everyone worse-off, I argued that it would be wrong for 
the imagined society to enforce prohibitions against (or in some cases 
to withhold) expression necessary to enable succeeding generations to 
form relatively independent judgments about the kind of life most 
worth living. Autonomy is a value of foundational moral importance.48 
And respect for autonomy, in a morally important sense of the term, 
requires the promotion of cultural conditions conducive to critical and 
self-critical reflection.49 
It might be objected that my rejection of unanimous agreement 
among living members of a society as the ultimate test of moral 
correctness depends on far-fetched cases and has little practical 
salience: in virtually all cases likely to arise, surely rights-based 
theories should be deemed unacceptable if they risk producing 
outcomes that literally everybody would think worse than identifiable 
alternatives. But the suggestion to ignore far-fetched cases lends no 
sort of reduction in individuals' well-being, for notions of fairness are principles of evalua­
tion that give weight to factors unrelated to individuals' well-being."). 
47. On the moral relevance of the circumstances under which preferences are formed, 
see, for example, ELSTER, supra note 23, at I 09-40. 
48. On autonomy and its significance, see, for example, GERALD DWORKIN, THE 
THEORY AND PRACflCE OF AUTONOMY (1988); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
72-81 ,  1 99-200 (1993); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). 
49. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Awonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 876-78 
( 1994) [hereinafter Fallon, Two Senses] (distinguishing a "descriptive" sense of autonomy. as 
a condition that exists as a matter of degree and is capable of promotion, from an "ascrip­
tive" sense of autonomy that refers to the supposed metaphysical foundation of people's 
rights to make decisions for themselves). When autonomy is used in the descriptive sense, it 
"requires the capacity to reflect upon, order, and self-critically revise the tastes, passions, 
and desires that present themselves as reasons for action." Id. at 887. 
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support to Kaplow and Shavell's argument that rights-based theories 
should be rejected because they·risk making everyone worse-off. On 
the contrary, Kaplow and Shavell's argument requires far-fetched 
cases to achieve any bite whatsoever. 
If asked to rank their personal preferences, most fairness theorists 
would presumably prefer living under fairness-based rules to living 
under rules based entirely on other considerations. If so; and if well­
being is defined ordinally by reference to each person's preferences 
for states of affairs, then no legal rule that was preferred by even a 
single fairness theorist could diminish everyone's well-being; if the 
fairness theorist values fairness over other goods, then her well-being 
will increase (under an ordinal definition of well-being) if fairness­
based rules are adopted.so 
Absent a more substantive definition of well-being, Kaplow and 
Shavell's principal fresh argument against rights-based theories - that 
they risk making everyone worse-off - thus succeeds only insofar as 
rights-based rules are adopted for situations in which literally no one 
thinks they ought to be adopted. This is a logically possible hazard, but 
a somewhat other-worldly one. For Kaplow and Shavell's negative 
arguments to work against real-world opponents, they need a substan­
tive definition that both distinguishes well-being from other possible 
grounds for choice and makes it possible to explain why everyone 
would judge well-being to be more valuable than any other good -
such as the protection of rights or the promotion of fairness - for 
which well-being might be sacrificed. 
Of equal importance, Kaplow and Shaven need a substantive con­
ception of well-being in order to carry out the welfare economic 
analysis that they endorse. Their version of welfare economics re­
quires interpersonal comparisons of well-being or utility.st If a change 
in the prevailing legal rule would increase Smith's well-being but 
diminish Jones's, Kaplow and Shaven maintain that we need to know 
the size of Smith's gain in comparison with Jones's loss in order to 
gauge the net effect on social welfare. In order to make the requisite 
comparison, however, we need to look at something more than 
Smith's and Jones's bare preference orderings. Interpersonal compari­
sons presuppose that well-being comes in measurable quantities. 
To get from preference orderings to commensurable units of well­
being, it would be logically possible simply to assign numerical values 
50. See Michael B. Dorf, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kap/ow and 
Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 859 (2002) (noting that strong advocates of a fairness theory 
will be made worse-off by the adoption of any other theory). 
51. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 24 n.1 5 ("Implicit in any social welfare 
function is a comparison of, and a way of trading off, different individuals' utilities."). 
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to each person's ordinal preference rankings,52 perhaps ascribing a 
value of one to the most preferred outcome and zero to �he least pre­
ferred along some bounded scale, and then to make interpersonal 
comparisons based on the. assigned numerical representations.53 As I 
shall argue more fully in Part III, however, any effort to define and 
measure well-being by equating it with preference orderings would 
misdescribe both moral and psychological reality. We value diverse 
goods in diverse ways and for diverse reasons; our own well-being -
which I shall loosely define in Part III  by reference to the overall 
quality of our psychological experience - is one good, but not the 
only good that we may value. A person who sacrifices her life to save 
others pursues a goal that she values more than her
"
own well-being­
not the greatest quantity of well-being, or indeed the greatest quantity 
of anything else, that she is capable of attaining. In light of the variety 
of reasons for which we may value goods and ideals, the equation of 
well-being with numerical values assigned Jo ordinal. preference rank­
ings would mischaracterize both well-being (which is not the only con­
sideration underlying preference order�ngs) and the complex founda­
tions of judgments of relative value (which need not .aim at the 
maximization of any si
.
ngle good). This being so, the resulting numeri­
cal comparisons would be too conceptually as well as epistemically ar­
bitrary to serve as the sole relevant consideration in the design of legal 
policies.54 
Most philosophers and economists who support interpersonal 
comparisons of well-being do not contend otherwise. Instead of 
attempting to assign quantitative values to purely ordinal preference 
rankings, they assume almost without exception that well-being must 
be defined substantively, as something (such as happiness or the satis-
52. This is the approach famously advanced for the purpose of making intrapersonal 
utility comparisons in JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSCAR MORGENSTERN. THE THEORY OF 
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944). 
53. See Peter J. Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They 
Should Be Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 200, 215-16 (Jon 
Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991) [hereinafter INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS] (consid­
ering but rejecting this possibility). 
54. See id. at 216 (arguing that if "some undemanding person . . .  achieves his upper bound 
at a low level of consumption," whereas a "greedy" person reaches his upper bound only al a 
much higher level, "and if we distribute goods to each individual so that each achieves, say, 90% 
of his maximum utility (which is now a well-defined utility level), then the greedy person is likely 
to be given much more than one feels he deserves"). 
In arguing that numerical values assigned to ordinal preference rankings would be con­
ceptually and epistemically arbitrary, I do not mean to deny that interpersonal comparisons 
of well-being are possible. so long as well-being is defined in conceptually plausible terms 
that permit interpersonal comparisons. For example, I accept that it is possible to make 
rough interpersonal comparisons of experiential states or of the extent to which different 
people possess objective goods. (If well-being were defined in those terms, I would. 
however. maintain that well-being is not necessarily what everyone values most.) I mean 
only to reject the possibility of quantitative interpersonal comparisons of well-being that are 
based directly on ordinal preference orderings and exclude all other information. 
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faction of desires, for example) that each person's preference rankings 
seek to maximize, the attainment of which can be measured in quanti­
tative terms.55 In much of their argument, Kaplow and Shaven accept 
this approach. Somewhat surprisingly, they purport to be agnostic 
about which substantive measure of well-being ought to be used,56 
saying only that "legal policy analysis should be guided by reference to 
some coherent way of aggregating individuals' well-being."57 Plainly, 
however, selecting a "coherent way of aggregating individuals' well­
being" will require the adoption of a substantive theory or measure of 
well-being, such that each person can be said to possess some quantity 
of it that can then be compared with every other person's. 
2 .  Substantive Accounts of Well-Being and Their Relation to Rational 
Choice 
Although necessary for the welfare economic analysis that Kaplow 
and Shaven champion:, movement from an ordinal to a cardinal and 
indeed to a substantive theory of well�being does not come without 
cost to their argument. Once a substantive theory or measure of well­
being is adopted, the claim that the greatest possible well-being is 
necessarily what everyone values most - which is tautologically true 
if each person's well-being is measured by her ordinal preference 
rankings - ceases to be tenable.58 If well-being is defined substan­
tively, it is always an open question whether any particular theory or 
measure of well-being accurately captures what everyone values 
most.59 If not, then a reduction in everyone's well-being, as thus 
defined, might not be unacceptable after all (whether in rea·sonably 
imaginable or in far-fetched cases). We would need to know what was 
obtained instead. 
In the philosophical and economic
. 
literature, the leading theories 
of well-being cluster into three categories - objective list theories, 
55. Cf BECKER, supra note 25, at 23 (advancing an economic model of rational choice 
under which choices are assumed to be "forward-looking" and "maximizing"). 
56. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 27 n.22 (citing the literature discussing 
whether interpersonal utility comparisons are possible and. if so, what common measure 
ought to be used). For an introduction to some of the leading positions and central issues, 
see INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS, supra note 53. 
57. KA PLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 27. 
58. See SEN, COMMODITIES, supra note 45, at 2-3 ("[O)ne's view of one's own welfare 
and the maximand in choice behaviour may each respectively be called 'utility' without great 
difficulty, but if both are called 'utility' and treated as the same, then it would have been im­
plicitly presumed that what one always maximizes is indeed one's own welfare."). 
59. Cf GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 68-69 (Thomas Baldwin ed., 
rev. ed., with pref. to the 2d ed. and other papers 1993) (objecting to efforts to equate 
goodness with natural properties by noting that such efforts always leave open the question 
about any particular natural property: " ls  this good?"). 
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experiential theories, and preference-based theories.w Yet none es­
tablishes well-being as a good that all rational people would always 
value over other, sometimes competing, values. As I have suggested 
already and shall argue more fully i n  Part III, there are many goods, 
choice among which can rationally rest on diverse grounds. We can, 
and do, value things besides our own well-being (as defined by the 
most plausible substantive measures). 
"Objective list"61 theories hold that a person's well-being consists 
of having certain goods and opportunities that are objectively 
valuable, or that people have reason to desire, or that are typically 
necessary or useful for a fulfilling life.62 Although otherwise unclear 
about what well-being is, Kaplow and Shaven reject objective list 
theories, apparently because such theories leave too little room for 
subjective valuation.63 In their view, both value and well-being are 
relative to i ndividual tastes.64 
A second leading approach equates well-being with an experiential 
state such as pleasure or happiness.65 The appeal of experiential con­
ceptions lies largely in their capacity to explain why everyone would 
value well-being. Pleasure and happiness are plausibly viewed as states 
that every normal person would regard as a good, both for herself and 
for others.66 Pain seems equally to be an experiential state that 
everyone, or nearly everyone, would wish to avoid, possibly for 
reasons too basic to permit further explanation. 
60. For substantially similar tripartite categorizations, albeit using slightly different 
labels, see, for example, JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, 
AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 7-72 (1986); L.W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS, AND ETHICS 
45-137 ( 1996); Scanlon, supra note 1, at 99-119. 
61. This label apparently traces to DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493 (1984). 
62 See SUMNER, supra note 60, at 45-80 (describing and critiquing various "objective" 
theories). 
63. See KA PLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 3, at 29-30 n.27 ("[W)hen the analyst decides 
which goods are primary . . .  and what importance each is to have, and then weights them 
differently from how the actual individuals in society weight them . . .  individuals will be 
made worse off . . . .  Indeed. such . . .  approaches sometimes would favor regimes under 
which everyone is worse off."). 
64. See id. (asserting that people are made worse-off when "given less of those things 
that they value more than the analyst does and more of those things that they value less than 
the analyst does"). 
65. This approach traces to JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION l l - 12  (J.H. Bums & H .L.A. Hart eds., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1970) ( 1780) (defining utility in terms of "pleasure" or "happiness"), and JOHN 
STUART MILL, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM. ON LIBERTY, AND CONSIDERATIONS ON 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT I ,  6 (H.B. Acton ed., 1 972) ("The creed which accepts as 
the foundation of morals, Utility or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are 
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the 
reverse of happiness."). 
66. See, e.g., Scanlon, supra note I ,  at 97 ("We all care about the experiential quality of 
our lives and have reason to do so."). 
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Even if certain experiential states are widely valued and others 
disvalued, however, people commonly value things besides experien­
tial states.67 John Stuart Mill thought it a better, more choice-worthy 
life to be like "Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."68 A person 
taking this view might choose to live in a society protecting broad 
freedom of speech, even if what was said made her less happy overall 
than she would be in a society in which speech was sharply 
constrained. To cite just one more example, at the end of his life, 
Freud reportedly refused any drug stronger than aspirin, despite suf­
fering excruciating pain, because he valued the capacity to think 
clearly more than pleasure, happiness, or the avoidance of pain.69 
A third kind of theory, defining well-being as the satisfaction of 
desires or preferences,70 might seem to draw a tighter, even concep­
tual, connection between individual well-being and what everyone 
values most.71 To have a preference is to prefer that it be satisfied; and 
it might seem to follow that everyone would place the highest value on 
having her preferences as fully satisfied as possible. But this apparent 
tautology depends on the assumption that preference satisfaction is 
defined ordinally, measured by each person's rank ordering of possi-
67. See, e.g. , GRIFFIN, supra note 60, at 13 (noting that "we desire things other than 
states of mind"); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 42-45 (1974) (arguing 
that people would rationally refuse to surrender themselves to a machine designed to 
produce pleasurable or satisfying states of consciousness because we value challenge and 
achievement sometimes more than states of consciousness); cf KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra 
note 3, at 18 ("Well-being is not restricted to hedonistic and materialistic enjoyment or to 
any other named class of pleasures and pains."). 
68. MILL, supra note 65, at 9. Curiously, Mill believed this view consistent with the defi­
nition of well-being or utility as an experiential state, but critics have persuasively argued 
otherwise. See H .B. Acton, Introduction to MILL, supra note 65, at ix, xiii-iv (asserting the 
untenability of Mill's position). 
69. See GRIFFIN, supra note 60, at 8. 
70. Leading works equating utility or well-being with the satisfaction of preferences or 
desires include R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING (1981), Ha.rsanyi, supra note 1 6, at 54-56, 
and J.A. Mirrlees, The Economic Uses of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, 
supra note 16, at 63. 
71 .  Although Kaplow and Shavell do not expressly affirm a preference-satisfaction 
account of well-being, much of their text invites the conclusion they in fact equate well-being 
with the satisfaction of preferences. They say, for example, that, although they typically 
assume well-being to be unambiguous, "if individuals do not understand how their situations 
affect their well-being, our argument may be applied to individuals' actual well-being -
what they would prefer if they correctly understood how they would be affected." KAPLOW 
AND SHA YELL, supra note 3, at 23. Jn the course of a long section. id. at 409-36, discussing 
"preferences and individuals' well-being," they a·pprovingly cite authors who have claimed 
that normative analysis should be based on "rational, fully informed preferences." Id. at 410 
n.24. And they insist repeatedly that notions of fairness become relevant to welfare eco­
nomic analysis insofar, but only insofar, as people have a "taste" or "preference" for fair­
ness. See, e.g., id. at 431-36 (discussing "tastes for notions of fairness"). 
Kaplow and Shaven do not, however, expressly embrace a substantive conception of 
well-being as preference satisfaction, and nothing in my argument depends on the assump­
tion that they equate well-being with preference satisfaction. 
996 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:979 
ble states of affairs.72 As I have argued already, however, individual 
rank orderings are insufficient to support meaningful interpersonal 
utility comparisons. Interpersonal comparisons require cardinal 
measures of well-being, and the most plausible cardinal measures 
presuppose a substantive conception of well-being as something lying 
behind individual preference orderings - something that each person 
gets more or less of as she moves from one ranked state of affairs to 
another. 
Once the requirement of quantification is introduced, I doubt that 
there could be a coherent, substantive, ethically significant notion of 
well-being as preference satisfaction that did not collapse into an ex­
periential conception.73 On this view, to say that Jones's preferences 
are better satisfied than Smith 's is just to say that Jones enjoys a better 
experiential state, one of greater satisfaction. Lending support to this 
interpretation, leading proponents of a preference-satisfaction concep­
tion of well-being call for well-being to be measured by reference 
either to general laws of psychology74 or through thought experiments 
in which an observer imagines others' psychological states and com­
pares their intensity or satisfactoriness with her own.75 What is more, if 
preference-satisfaction conceptions of well-being are not experiential 
conceptions, then their ethical significance would seem doubtful. In 
the absence of an experiential payoff, it is far from obvious that a 
person's well-being is enhanced whenever her preferences are satis­
fied, or that there is any ethical reason to aim to satisfy others' prefer­
ences.76 Suppose, for example, that Jones prefers that Christians 
72. See Sen, Personal Utilitie.v, supra note 18,  at 551-52 ("[l]f utilities are defined entirely 
in terms of choice, then a person will be seen as maximising his utility in every feasible 
choice. But this assertion, then, is no more than a tautology."); Sen, Rational Fools, supra 
note I ,  at 323 (observing that many economists assume that "the only way of understanding 
a person's real preference is to examine his actual choices, and there is no choice­
independent way of understanding someone's attitude towards alternatives"). 
73. Cf Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 
YALE L.J. 165, 206-08 (1999) (noting arguments that preference-based theories must ulti­
mately collapse into theories that equate well-being with either objective goods or an expe­
riential state). 
74. See Harsanyi, supra note 16, at SO (asserting that "any interpersonal utility 
comparison is based on what I will call the similarity postulate . . .  that, once proper allow­
ances have been made for the empirically given differences in taste, education, etc., between 
me and another person, then it is reasonable for me to assume that our basic psychological 
reactions to any given alternative will be otherwise much the same"). 
75. See HARE, supra note 70, at 128-29 (proposing a method of making interpersonal 
comparisons that depends on "reduc[ing] comparisons between other people's preferences 
to comparisons between our own"). 
76. See Adler & Posner, supra note 73, at 202-03 (endorsing a "restricted" preference or 
desire-based account of well-being under which the mere satisfaction of a person's prefer­
ences cannot be deemed to increase her well-being unless further conditions are satisfied, 
including possibly a condition that. the person have a psychological experience of satisfac­
tion). 
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should always be given advantages over non-Christians. Suppose fur­
ther that a Christian is given an advantage over a non-Christian, but 
that Jones knows nothing about it and that the course of her life is 
wholly unaffected. Although Jones's preference has been satisfied, I 
find it implausible that her well-being is thereby increased. I find it 
equally implausible that Jones's preference should count as a factor of 
any ethical weight whatsoever in determining whether Christians 
should be given advantages over non-Christians in situations that are 
unknown to Jones and that leave her life unaffected. It is not of course 
implausible to think that Jones's well-being would be increased if she 
knew that a Christian received an advantage over a non-Christian and 
if she felt a resulting sense of pleasure or gratification. But the need to 
appeal to psychological experience supports the view that preference­
satisfaction conceptions of well-being are ultimately experiential 
ones, with preference satisfaction mattering only insofar as it contrib­
utes to the quality of a person's psychological experience.77 If prefer­
ence-satisfaction conceptions of well-being are actually experiential 
conceptions, however, then they are vulnerable to the objection that I 
raised earlier: we both can and sometimes do value the realization of 
ideals more than maximizing personal psychological satisfaction. 
Whether or not preference-satisfaction conceptions of well-being 
are ultimately reducible to experiential conceptions, the notion that 
everyone would accord the highest value or rank order to the maximal 
satisfaction of her preferences, regardless of what those prefer­
ences might be or become, dissolves upon a close examination of the 
relationships among maximal preference satisfaction, choice, and 
informed choice. As it turns out, there is a conceptual and sometimes 
a practical difference between maximally satisfying a person's prefer­
ences - once preference satisfaction is understood in substantive 
terms, rather than measured by a person's ordinal ranking of states of 
affairs - and giving a person what she would rationally choose for 
herself.78 
An example drawn from constitutional law will begin to illustrate 
the complex relationships among maximal preference satisfaction, 
choice, and informed choice. Suppose that legal analysts wish to de­
termine when the government should be permitted to forbid political 
speech that either advocates violation of the law or is likely to 
encourage violation of the law.79 Suppose further, for sake of simplic-
77. See Scanlon, supra note 1 ,  at 100 (developing a similar argument). 
78. For other arguments rejecting the equation of well-being with the maximal satisfac­
tion of a person's preferences, regardless of what those preferences happen to be, see, for 
example, SUMNER, supra note 60, at 134-35; Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 1, at 329. 
79. The Supreme Court cases dealing with this issue are excerpted, summarized, and 
analyzed in JESSE H. CHOPER, RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., YALE KAMISAR, & STEVEN H. 
SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 570-613 (9th ed. 2001 ). 
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ity, that there are just three possible rules. Under a Bad Consequences 
Rule, the government may punish speech whenever it has any ten­
dency to promote consequences, however remote, that the govern­
ment might reasonably deem harmful. Under a Clear and Present 
Danger Rule,80 the government may punish speech only if it presents a 
clear and present danger of serious harm. Under an Advocacy of 
Imminent Illegality Rule, the government may not punish speech criti­
cizing or urging resistance to laws and governmental policies unless 
the speaker expressly advocates imminent illegal conduct and her ad­
vocacy poses a serious risk of great, imminent harm.81 Suppose finally, 
again for sake of simplicity, that the question is restricted to which of 
these rules would best promote the well-being of a single person, 
Jones. 
We can imagine first that what would satisfy Jones's preferences 
might be defined by what she, if asked, would actually choose. But 
writers who equate well-being with preference satisfaction view this 
approach as too simplistic.82 Among other things, the effect of the 
various rules in promoting the satisfaction of Jones's preferences 
would also depend on the rules' effects in, for example, promoting a 
vibrant society, which we may assume that Jones would value, or 
causing a breakdown of public order, which she would dislike. When 
questions about likely consequences grow complex, many people lack 
sufficient information to answer competently. 
When people would be prone to make bad calculations, propo­
nents of a preference satisfaction conception of well-being . typically 
suggest that preference satisfaction (and thus a person's well-being) is 
defined by what a person would choose if fully rational and fully 
informed.83 This formulation is ambiguous, however. On one interpre­
tation, it refers to what a person would choose if she were fully ra­
tional and fully informed, with no consideration given to the fact that 
she is not in actuality fully rational and fully informed. To see the im-
80. Cf Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 ( 1919) ("The question in every case is 
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create 
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has 
a right to prevent."). 
81. Cf Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 ( 1969) (articulating "the principle that 
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is di­
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action"). 
82. See, e.g., Harsanyi, supra note 16, at 55 (insisting that "social utility must be defined 
in terms of people's true preferences rather than in terms of their manifest preferences"); see 
also KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 23 (observing that "if individuals do not 
understand how situations affect their well-being," calculations of well-being should be 
based on "what they would prefer if they correctly understood how they would be af­
fected"). 
83. See KAPLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 3, at 23; Harsanyi, supra note 16, at 55. 
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plications of this position, consider, again, the case of Jones and the 
three possible free speech rules, and imagine that the following 
situation obtains : although Jones would actually choose the Bad 
Consequences rule if asked, she would do so based on a miscalculation 
of likely effects; if she were fully informed and fully rational, she 
would see that the Advocacy of Imminent Illegality Rule would best 
satisfy her fully informed and fully rational preferences. 
If dispositive weight is given to what Jones would choose if fully ra­
tional and informed, with no adjustment for the fact that she is not 
fully rational and informed, adoption of the Advocacy of Imminent 
Illegality Rule is the outcome that would maximally promote the 
satisfaction of Jones's preferences. On this interpretation, however, 
satisfying Jones's "informed preferences" could not only frustrate her 
actual or uninformed preferences, but also make her very unhappy. If 
the Advocacy of Imminent Illegality Rule were adopted, we can 
imagine that Jones would suffer anger and anxiety, due to her 
misplaced fear of the consequences. Indeed, in light of this anger 
and anxiety, we can imagine that she would be unhappier under the 
Advocacy of Imminent Illegality Rule than she would be under the 
Bad Consequences Rule that she would actually choose if asked. If, 
however, satisfying Jones's "informed preferences" can entail both 
denying Jones what she would actually choose and making her 
unhappier than she would be if she got what she would actually 
choose, it seems plain that a conceptual gap exist� between a person's 
well-being (as thus defined) and what a person could rationally value 
most. In a case of this kind, a person could rationally choose to have 
her actual choice respected, with the consequence that she would be 
happier, rather than to be given what she would want if she were more 
rational and better informed than she actually is. 
Another interpretation would obviate this objection. According to 
it, to satisfy a person's fully informed and rational preferences essen­
tially means to give a person what she would want if she were fully in­
formed and fully rational and if, in that state, she discounted for the 
fact that she is not in actuality fully informed and fully rational. On 
this interpretation, it is relevant that Jones would choose the 
Advocacy of Imminent Illegality Rule if she were fully informed and 
fully rational, but it is also relevant that she would experience anger 
and anxiety if that rule were adopted. Under this interpretation, we 
can thus imagine that although Jones would actually choose the Bad 
Consequences Rule, and although she would choose the Advocacy of 
Imminent Illegality Rule if she were perfectly informed and rational, 
the rule that would best satisfy her partially mistaken and conflicted 
preferences is the Clear and Present Danger Rule. 
Although this is not a wholly implausible interpretation of prefer­
ence satisfaction or of well-being, it has startlingly reductionist impli­
cations if taken as a measure of what a rational person would always 
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value most. According to this view, human agency in choosing does 
not matter for its own sake, but only insofar as agency is valuable i n  
getting preferences satisfied. Indeed, it .is little exaggeration to say that 
this conception reflects a view of human beings largely as engines for 
the registration of preference satisfaction.84 The reductionist implica­
tions of this interpretation of preference satisfaction make me doubt­
ful that preference satisfaction, as thus defined, captures all that 
people either do or ought to value. 
Return to the example of the three possible free speech rules. 
Now, however, imagine that Jones's actual choice is the Advocacy of 
Imminent Illegality Rule. I believe that she might rationally adhere to 
this choice even if she received and credited omniscient advice that the 
Bad Consequences Rule, rather than the Advocacy of Imminent 
Illegality Rule, would best promote the satisfaction of her preferences 
over the course of her life. We can plausibly imagine Jones reasoning 
as follows: if the Bad Consequences Rule were adopted, the society 
would be well-ordered and tame, and over time she would develop a 
set of increasingly conventional preferences that would be extremely 
well satisfied.85 When present and future preferences are both taken 
into account, she might therefore achieve greater overall preference 
satisfaction if her current preference for the Advocacy of Imminent 
Illegality Rule were frustrated and if she developed new, more readily 
satisfiable preferences in the future. Indeed, Jones recognizes (we may 
imagine) that her possible future preferences would be so well satis­
fied that she would later agree that the decision to adopt the Bad 
Consequences Rule was the best one for her. Nonetheless, Jones 
would currently choose the Advocacy of Imminent Illegality Rule 
because, looking to her own future, she would rather realize a norma­
tive ideal, leading an intellectually challenged and challenging life, 
than achieve the greatest possible quantum of preference satisfaction 
over the course of her life.86 
Under these circumstances, there is a clear distinction between 
what Jones might rationally choose and what would best promote the 
fulfillment of her preferences over the course of her life. Quite imag­
inably, Jones would rationally choose something other than the maxi­
mal satisfaction of her "actual preferences . . . for so long as they 
remain in existence and [her] new ones after [her] preferences have 
84. This view is also startlingly paternalistic, at least in the context of a theory commit­
ted to the view that "[t]he idea of an analyst substituting his or her own conception of what 
individuals should value for the actual views of the individuals themselves conflicts with 
individuals' basic autonomy and freedom." KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 421-22. 
85. On adaptive preference formation, see ELSTER, supra note 23, at 109-40. 
86. Cf ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 59-60 (1993) 
(describing a person's concern "about the sort of person she will become" as "not a welfare 
consideration," but nonetheless one that is capable of motivating rational choice). 
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changed."87 To borrow again from Mill, she might rather live like 
"Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."88 
It might be objected that the imagined circumstances of Jones's 
choice are peculiar, involving a narrow question about how a 
preference-satisfaction conception of well-being ought to deal with 
metapreferences, or even more particularly with potential collisions 
between what R.M. Hare calls "now-for-then" and "then-for-then" 
preferences.89 But the issue raised by a person's concern about the 
kind of person she wants to be cuts deeper, revealing both a concep-
. tual and a psychological gap between maximal preference satisfaction 
(as a measure of well-being) and what people could rationally value or 
choose. 
This gap is important. If well-being (defined substantively as 
maximal preference satisfaction) is not the only thing that rational 
people would value, and especially if it need not be what rational 
people would always value above all else, then a theory that dimin­
ished everyone's well-being should not be viewed as necessarily 
unacceptable on that ground. It becomes important to ask whether 
any particular non-welfarist theory gives people, instead of increments 
of welfare, something that they might actually and rationally choose 
instead. 
B .  Welfare Economics and Outcomes That Nobody Would Choose 
In developing my argument so far, I have not denied Kaplow and 
Shavell's central logical claim: adoption of a moral theory that weighs 
considerations other than well-being could result in the reduction of 
some people's, or in extreme cases everybody's, utility.90 But if well­
being is distinguished from what people might actually and rationally 
choose, as I have argued that it should be, then a symmetrical objec­
tion becomes available against welfare economic theories that con­
sider nothing but well-being as defined by a substantive measure: a 
theory that considered only well-being (defined substantively as an 
experiential state or as preference satisfaction, for example) could 
imaginably dictate the imposition of legal rules contrary to those that 
literally everyone, except the dictator herself, would actually and ra­
tionally choose. 
Imagine, for example, that a question arises about how broadly to 
define freedom of speech and religion. Imagine further that recogni­
tion of a broad freedom would reduce everyone's .happiness or overall 
87. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 418. 
88. MILL, supra note 65, at 9. 
89. See HARE, supra note 70, at 101-02. 
90. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 52-58 (developing this argument). 
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level of preference satisfaction in light of the contingently prevailing 
conditions and distribution of psychological attitudes in a particular 
society. For example, the more people heard or learned about what 
others thought, the unhappier or more frustrated everyone might 
grow, and the overall level of everyone's preference satisfaction might 
diminish.91 Even on these suppositions, members of the imagined 
society might reasonably choose a broad definition of protected 
speech. To echo Mill again, they might rationalJy think it better to live 
like "Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."92 
Nor is this the end of the difficulty for Kaplow and Shavell's con­
ception of welfare economics. As I argued above, Kaplow and Shaven 
employ two conceptions of well-being. They embrace a version of 
welfare economics that requires interpersonal comparisons of utility 
and, accordingly, demands the adoption of a substantive conception of 
well-being (such as happiness or preference satisfaction) that will 
permit interpersonal comparisons. In criticizing rights-based theories, 
however, they appear to employ an ordinal definition under which 
people are better or worse-off depending on their personal rank 
ordering of states of affairs. If I am right that welfare economics, using 
one of the most plausible substantive measures of well-being, could 
sometimes dictate legal rules that literally nobody would choose, then 
Kaplow and Shavell's preferred approach stands guilty of precisely the 
same charge that they lodge against fairness theories: it risks reducing 
everyone's well-being as defined by an ordinal conception, reflecting 
each person's rank ordering of possible states of affairs. Under an 
ordinal measure of well-being, each might think herself worse-off if 
denied what she would actually and rationally choose so that her hap­
piness could be increased or the long-term satisfaction of her prefer­
ences could be maximized (and her well-being thus enhanced under a 
substantive measure). 
Against these arguments, it might again be objected that if people 
would choose to live like Socrates, dissatisfied, then being dissatisfied 
must be what best satisfies their preferences. But as long as well-being 
and preference satisfaction are defined in substantive terms, this 
mildly paradoxical claim founders for reasons that I have discussed 
already. People might recognize that if they began to live like fools, 
they would gradually acquire fools' preferences, which would then be 
better satisfied than their Socratic preferences ever could be. If so, 
they could rationally choose not to have their preferences maximally 
satisfied.93 
9.1 . See ELSTER, supra note 23, at 1 33-36 (developing a similar example as a criticism of 
utilitarianism). 
92. MILL, supra note 65, at 9. 
93. Alternatively, a defender of the preference-satisfaction approach might argue that 
satisfying people's preferences just means giving people what they would choose for 
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Once it is recognized that welfare economic analysis could dictate 
results contrary to what literally everyone would choose, Kaplow and 
Shavell's principal negative argument against fairness theories 
collapses. Yes, fairness theories could imaginably make everyone 
worse-off (under an ordinal measure of well-being), but so could wel­
fare economics. The choice between a fairness and a welfarist theory 
must be made on some other ground. 
II.  WELL-BEING AND EX ANTE CONTRACTS 
In contending that well-being should be the sole concern in the 
design of legal rules, Kaplow and Shaven rely on a positive argument, 
not just the negative argument that fairness-based approaches could 
diminish everyone's well-being. According to Kaplow and Shaven, if 
people did not know their positions in society, they would always 
choose legal rules based solely on their anticipated well-being.94 In the 
view of many analysts, this means that rational contractors, ex ante, 
would always opt for the rule structure likely to produce the highest 
average utility.95 
Without rehearsing familiar debates about this issue, I would make 
just two points. First, in order to assess what weight ex ante contrac­
tors would attach to well-being, it is crucial to know how well-being is 
defined. If, for example, well-being were defined in terms of happi-
themselves if fully informed and rational. In essence, this argument attempts to retreat from 
a substantive to an ordinal conception of well-being, under which each person is deemed 
better-off whenever she moves from a state of affairs that she ranks lower to one that she 
would choose instead. As I have emphasized, however, the ordinal conception of well-being 
that is employed by this test is not adequate for the welfare economic analysis championed 
by Kaplow and Shaven. For good reason, their version of welfare e�onomics calls for inter­
personal comparisons of well-being, which in turn demand the kind of common metric that 
only a substantive conception of well-being can provide. A purely ordinal conception of 
well-being would also make it impossible to say that a person could be made better-off if her 
preferences were changed, so that they could be more fully satisfied, even if the person does 
not currently wish her preferences changed - notwithstanding the assertions of Kaplow and 
Shavell that people's well-being could sometimes be improved if their preferences were 
altered. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 416-17 (discussing scenarios in which 
people would be better-off if their preferences were altered). 
In addition, as I have argued already, this view would make it difficult if not impossible 
to draw the sharp line that welfare economists wish to draw between well-being and fairness­
based theories, at least in a world in which anyone values (a conception of) fairness: as long 
as even a single theorist would rationally choose to live under a legal regime implementing 
her views about fairness, it could not be said that that regime made everyone worse-off, 
because the theorist herself would have to be viewed as better-off. 
94. See id. at 442 ("We do not see a persuasive affirmative argument for an ex post view 
that would trump policies that maximize individuals' well-being ex ante - policies that have 
in fact received individuals' consent or that would receive it [in an ex ante bargaining situa­
tion]."). 
95. See, e.g. , Harsanyi, supra note 16, at 46; see also KAPLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 3, 
at 442 (asserting that ex ante contractors would choose policies "that maximize individuals' 
well-being ex ante"). 
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ness, rational ex ante contractors would not necessarily prefer rules 
exclusively promoting happiness and, for example, according no inde­
pendent significance to opportunities for the free development and 
use of intellectual and moral faculties. Nor would such contractors 
necessarily choose exclusively to maximize preference satisfaction, 
insofar as there is a difference between satisfying people's preferences 
and giving them what they would rationally choose for themselves. 
It is more plausible, I think, to imagine that rational ex ante 
contractors, if charged to select general principles of social justice (in 
the way that Rawls, for example, imagines),96 might aim solely to pro­
vide themselves with the most attractive bundle of what Rawls calls 
primary goods97 - a rubric encompassing basic "rights and liberties, 
opportunities and powers, income and wealth."98 Within Rawls's 
framework, "primary goods are social background conditions and all­
purpose means generally necessary for forming and rationally pursu­
ing a conception of the good."99 He says explicitly, however, that "the 
share of primary goods that citizens receive is not intended as a 
measure of their psychological well-being."100 
As I shall emphasize in Part III, I do not believe that principles of 
social justice could be generated solely through instrumentally ra­
tional, self-interested calculation. At least some moral principles must 
be accepted as the provisional starting point for further moral thought. 
My point for now is only that within the kind of framework that Rawls 
imagines, the design of which reflects a number of moral commit­
ments, rn• rational contractors would not necessarily choose to promote 
a substantive conception of well-being above all else. 
Second, it is far from obvious how much moral significance 
attaches to imagined ex ante contracts concerning particular legal 
rules when the totality of the surrounding rule structure could not also 
be justified by a hypothetical ex ante contract. To be concrete, I doubt 
very much that the legal rule structure currently prevailing in the 
United States could be justified in its entirety by appeal to what 
rational contractors would unanimously choose under fair and equal 
bargaining conditions. Although I obviously cannot address these mat-
96. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 1 1 -17  (197 1 )  (defining justice in terms of 
principles that would be unanimously agreed to by parties "in an initial situation that is 
fair"). 
97. See ill. al 92. 
98. Id. 
99. John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, 
supra note 16, at 1 59, 169 [hereinafter Rawls, Social Unity). 
100. Id. at 169. 
101. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in READING RAWLS I, 8-9 (Norman 
Daniels ed.. 1989) (arguing that Rawls's design of the so-called "original position" 
presupposes a theory of the good). 
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ters in depth, it is my strong belief that any plausible social contract 
resulting from fair bargaining positions would produce much greater 
distributive equality than currently exists. This would be true, I think, 
even if rational contractors opted for the legal structure likely to 
produce the greatest average utility (as measured, for example, by 
happiness or preference satisfaction). Given the plausible assumption 
of the declining marginal utility of money,102 I think that greater dis­
tributive equality would be mandated by the average utility principle. 
If the generally prevailing rule structure and its attendant distribu­
tive inequalities could not be justified by hypothetical ex ante contract, 
issues arise about whether particular rules could be justified 
successfully in this way. To take an admittedly charged example, 
suppose that the question is whether capital punishment should be 
permitted, notwithstanding worries that some of those being executed 
- for sake of argument, say one percent - are innocent. Suppose 
further, again for sake of argument, that the death penalty is a highly 
effective deterrent; because of it, hundreds fewer murders occur each 
year than would happen otherwise. Under these hypothesized facts, 
rational ex ante contractors would recognize that they are less likely to 
be killed, except as punishment for crimes they actually commit, in a 
legal regime with the death penalty than in one without the death 
penalty. With the death penalty, there is a small chance that each will 
be executed by the state for a crime she did not commit. But without 
the death penalty, each stands a greater risk of being killed by a 
private citizen (who might otherwise have been deterred). 
In considering whether this ex ante calculation should determine 
the appropriateness of capital punishment, the dramatically uneven 
distribution of income and opportunities is not obviously irrelevant. 
Those convicted of capital crimes tend disproportionately to come 
from disadvantaged classes, as measured by income103 and arguably by 
race.104 This being so, a question arises about whether it should be 
1 02. The theory of declining marginal utility holds that "the additional satisfaction de­
rived from an additional unit of a commodity" declines as a person consumes or acquires 
more of that commodity. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 75-76 (7th ed. 1991). 
As applied to money, the theory of declining marginal utility implies that an additional 
dollar gives less satisfaction to a rich person than to a poorer person. See JONATHAN 
BARON, MORALITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE 160 (1993) (characterizing the assumption of 
the declining marginal utility of money as "[m]ore reasonable" than idternative assump­
tions). 
1 03. See Craig Haney, Tile Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and tile 
logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 562-63 & n.35 (1995) (asserting "that 
persons accused and convicted of capital murder are very often the victims of poverty" and 
noting that "[tjhe widespread poverty of capital defendants is generally accepted and has 
escaped much academic commentary"). 
104. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the Death 
Penalty: Tile Need for the Racial Justice Act. 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519. 522-24 ( 1995) 
(summarizing various empirical studies and concluding that "the race of the defendant" is 
crucial in determining who is charged with and convicted of capital crimes). Perhaps the 
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deemed fair and acceptable to impose on persons who are disadvan­
taged by society's failure to live by principles that would be chosen in 
a fair bargaining position the further disadvantage of an elevated risk 
of execution, possibly as punishment for crimes they did not commit. 
The idea of an ex ante contract possesses ethical significance only as a 
modeling device. The underlying assumption appears to be that a rule 
is morally correct if it is "one which all could reasonably agree to and 
none could reasonably reject,"105 even when the rule's actual effects on 
particular people become known. If this is the ultimate touchstone of 
moral correctness, however, I worry that an innocent, disadvantaged 
person who was sentenced to death could reasonably reject the provi­
sion for capital punishment on the ground that it requires her to sacri­
fice too much for others in a context in which others are required to 
sacrifice too little for her.'06 
In presenting this concern, I do not mean to suggest that it is nec­
essarily decisive. Although capital punishment is disproportionately 
visited on members of disadvantaged classes, so are capital murders. 
On the facts that I have hypothesized concerning the deterrent effects 
of the death penalty, the disadvantaged as a group would suffer more 
from the abolition of the death penalty, on average or as a statistical 
matter, than would the wealthy. But suppose that murders of and by 
disadvantaged persons could be prevented as effectively through full 
employment programs as by the death penalty, and suppose further 
that the disadvantaged would generally prefer full employment 
programs to the death penalty as a policy for the reduction of murders. 
This congeries of hypothesized considerations seems plainly relevant 
to the design of legal policy, even if not dispositive of whether the 
most famous study of the effect of race in the administration of the death penalty, David 
Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia 
Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983), found that the largest race-based 
disparity in capital cases involved the race of the victim, not the race of the defendant. 
Although black defendants were 1 .1 times more likely to receive a death sentence than other 
defendants, defendants charged with the murder of a white were 4.3 times more likely to 
receive capital sentences than those charged with murdering blacks. The Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that these statistics showed Georgia's administration of the death 
penalty to be racially discriminatory and thus unconstitutional in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279 (1987). According to the Court, even if the statistics generated by the Baldus study 
were accurate, they failed to establish that particular decisionmakers engaged in intentional 
race-based decisionmaking. See id. at 292-93, 297. 
1 05. T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND 
BEYOND, supra note 16, at 122; cf. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 18 (1992) 
[hereinafter SEN, INEQUALITY] (observing that Rawls's reliance on an ex ante bargaining 
situation to generate principles of justice "can be seen as providing a specific structure for 
determining what one can or cannot reasonably reject"). 
106. Cf. Scanlon, supra note 105. at 123 (observing that in assessing reasonable grounds 
for the rejection of a principle, "our attention is naturally directed first to those who would 
do worst under it," because "if anyone has reasonably grounds for objecting . . .  it is likely to 
be them"). 
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death penalty should be deemed to violate a moral or constitutional 
right. 
In their defense of welfare economics, Kaplow and Shaven insist, 
probably correctly, that welfare economic analysis tends to do better 
than most fairness-based approaches in broadening the frame in which 
particular problems are analyzed.107 According to them, fairness 
theories tend to adopt a post hoc, backward-looking perspective, 
ignoring opportunities to establish rules that will msximize future 
social welfare.108 By contrast, they say, welfare economics requires 
analysts to consider which rule structure will make things better in the 
future.109 
Against this claim, my point is only that nearly all legal analysis -
including that commended and conducted by Kaplow and Shaven -
operates under framing constraints,110 with many contingent elements 
of the social, economic, and legal structure implicitly accepted as 
given.111 Analysis thus proceeds on a second-best, not a first-best, 
basis. I agree with Kaplow and Shavell that the optimal response to 
distributive inequities would typically be to deal directly with distribu­
tion.112 But in the absence of that response, there are inherent difficul­
ties in second-best normative analysis, in part because decisions about 
what to take as ''.given" are irreducibly contestable. Once the inevita­
bility of contestable framing constraints is acknowledged, the norma­
tive force of ex ante arguments attempting to justify particular rules is 
considerably diminished, especially insofar as those rules impose 
heavy burdens on those who are already among the least advantaged 
classes. 
III. WELL-BEING, IMPERSONAL VALUE, AND CHOICE-WORTHINESS 
Among the strands of argument that I have developed thus far, the 
most insistent has been a simple one. Although it is often assumed that 
107. See KAPLOW & SHA VELL, supra note 3, at 49 (characterizing welfare economics as 
"superior" to fairness-based approaches on this basis). 
1 08. See id. at 48 (asserting that assessments of fairness "are usually made from an ex 
post perspective"). 
109. See id. at 49 (asserting that ex ante, welfare economic analysis "reflects a complete 
consideration" of factors relevant to shaping future outcomes). 
1 10. See id. at 32 ("[W]hen undertaking any kind of analysis, it is often useful to focus 
on certain factors in order best to understand their effects, leaving other considerations 
aside."). 
1 1 1. See generally Daryl Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 1 1 1 
YALE L.J. 1 3 1 1  (2002) (discussing the crucial importance of how issues in constitutional law 
are framed). 
1 12. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 33 ("[W]hen legal rules do have dis­
tributive effects, the effects usually should not be counted as favoring or disfavoring the 
rules because distributive objectives can often be best accomplished directly, using the 
income tax and transfer (welfare) programs."). 
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each of us values her own well-being above all else, this assumption 
becomes highly questionable once well-being receives the substantive 
content necessary to support policy analysis, including the welfare­
economic calculations championed by Kaplow and Shaven. When 
well-being is defined substantively, a potential gap emerges between 
what would maximally promote people's well-being, as specified by a 
substantive measure; and what some people might rationally choose. 
In iight of this gap, a rule that diminishes well-being should not be 
deemed necessarily unacceptable on that ground alone. 
So far, however, I have not attempted to explain how or why 
people might rationally value goals, aims, or outcomes other than their 
own well-being (as defined by some substantive measure). Neither 
have I discussed how the notion of well-being appropriately enters 
into moral, political, or legal decisionmaking. Nor have I addressed 
the implications of individual valuation for the definition and 
enforcement of rights. In this Part, my aim is partly to remedy these 
deficiencies. My goal is not to make an independent contribution to 
moral and political philosophy. Much more modestly, I intend only to 
sketch the kind of rights-based approach that I believe coheres best 
with widely held beliefs about the nature of constitutional rights, to 
defend its assumptions in contrast with those of Kaplow and Shavell's 
version of welfare economics, and to demonstrate how it might 
respond to some of Kaplow and Shavell's barbed challenges. 
I begin in Section A by identifying the foundations of moral 
thinking in an "impersonal" standpoint capable of furnishing distinc­
tively moral reasons for action. The notion of a reason is fundamental 
in moral analysis, more so than the desire of each for her own well­
being, and Section A also discusses the role of reason in making judg­
ments of choice-worthiness. Section B distinguishes people's pruden­
tial interests in their own well-being, whi�h I define loosely as a 
sequence of desirable experiential states, from other kinds of reasons 
for valuing other goods. It also explains why our interests in our own 
well-being have no categorical priority over reasons involving moral 
and aesthetic ideals. Section C examines the significance of personal 
conceptions of well-being from the impersonal perspective. It 
maintains that some personal goals and satisfactions matter more than 
others and that autonomy is a distinct, sometimes supervening value. 
Section D defends the idea of rights framed to promote values other 
than welfare. Section E offers a concluding defense of the moral 
methodology on which my arguments in this Part rely. 
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A. Foundations of Moral Thinking 
1009 
As affirmed by a tradition of liberal or "impartialist" theories,113 
the foundation of moral thought lies in an "impersonal standpoint" 
from which each of us must recognize that, objectively speaking, we 
are no more important than anyone else.114 Each of us is a conscious 
being, capable of thought and experiential states; we all have goals, 
values, and interests that give meaning to our lives. Much if not most 
of the time, we pursue our goals and interests with unselfconscious 
attention.115 But we can, and sometimes do, take a more distanced 
view of our own situation. 116 
When we adopt an impartial point of view, our own goals, values, 
and interests do not lose significance for us. As Thomas Nagel puts it, 
" [y]ou cannot sustain an impersonal indifference to the things in your 
life which matter to you personally."1 17 Nonetheless, the impersonal 
standpoint generates distinctively moral reasons for action, grounded 
in the recognition that if I "matter impersonally, so does everyone" 
else;118 if some or all of my goals, values, and interests matter impar­
tially, then so do some or all of the goals, values, and interests of 
others.119 
• 
From an impartial point of view, I thus recognize that because 
others' lives matter as much as mine,120 it would be wrong for me to 
1 13. See generally BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY 217-33 (1995) (discussing 
"impartialist" theories). Kapfow and Shavell's reliance on arguments based on hypothetical 
ex ante contracts, see supra notes 94-112 and accompanying text, reflects an implicit if not 
explicit appeal to the notion of an impartial perspective. 
1 14. THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 10-11  (199 1 )  [hereinafter NAGEL, 
EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY]. It is beyond my ambition here to address the challenges 
posed by nonimpartialist or nonegalitarian approaches, including perfectionist and virtue­
based theories. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1 7  (Terence Irwin trans., 
1 985) (maintaining that "the human good turns out to be the soul's activity that expresses 
virtue); FREIDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL To POWER § 766, at 403 (Walter Kaufmann ed., 
1 967) (terming it a "basic error" to "place the goal in the herd and not in single individu­
als"). See generally THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM (1993) (reviewing and assessing theo­
ries based on ideals of individual perfection). 
1 15. See NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 1 14, at 10 ("Most of our ex­
perience of the world, and most of our desires, belong to our individual point of view: We 
see things from here, so to speak."). 
1 16. See id. ("But we are also able to think about the world in abstraction from our par-
ticular position in it - in abstraction from who we are.:'). 
1 1 7. Id. at 1 1 .  
1 18. Id. 
1 19. See id. at 13 ("[W]e are pulled toward the conclusion that what happens to anyone 
matters the same as if it had happened to anyone else."). 
1 20. See id. at 10-12 (noting that from an impersonal point of view everyone is as impor­
tant as the self appears from a personal standpoint). 
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put others' lives recklessly at risk.121 I also recognize that I have reason 
to sacrifice some of my own goals and interests to assist those with 
more urgent needs. 
In asserting that I have moral reasons, I use the term "reason" in a 
broad sense encompassing any consideration that may count in favor 
of an action or an assessment that an act ought (or ought not) to be 
done.122 This usage assumes · that our assessments of choice-worthiness 
reflect and are sensitive to reasons. It rejects Hume's celebrated claim 
that "reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions."123 On 
the Humean view, which loosely supports the claim of some econo­
mists that we always act for the ultimate purpose of promoting our 
own well-being,124 reason cannot tell us whether or how much we 
ought to value others' lives or anything else; it can only calculate how 
to achieve what we desire already. At a minimum, the Humean posi­
tion is too strong.125 Our desires are subject not only to criticism, but 
also to revision in the face of criticism.126 My desire to behave in cer­
tain ways may diminish or even disappear if I become persuaded that 
my desires are cruel or debased. It might then of course be said that 
what is fundamental is my desire not to be cruel or debased;127 reason 
simply tells me how to satisfy that desire. By no means, however, does 
desire, viewed as antecedent to reason, always play the fundamental 
motivational role that this objection assumes.128 Reason is frequently 
crucial. 
121 .  Kaplow and Shavell emphasize that attitudes such as this may be substantially or 
even wholly the product of evolutionary biology and social conditioning. See KAPLOW & 
SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 62-76; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF 
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 33-37 (1999) (attempting to explain moral sentiments and al­
truistic behavior solely by reference to cultural conditioning and evolutionary biology). I do 
not question that the origins of our moral sentiments may lie in these sources. But we are 
capable of questioning our unreflective notions and determining whether they should be 
altered or even abandoned in light of critical assessment. For further discussion of the role of 
critical assessment in moral thinking, see infra notes 125-128, 192-197 and accompanying 
text. 
1 22 See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 1 7  { 1 998) [hereinafter 
SCANLON, WHAT WE Owe] (characterizing "the idea of a reason as primitive" and capable 
only of circular definition according to which "to be a reason for something" is to be "a con­
sideration that counts in favor of it"). 
1 23. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 413-18 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1985) (1739). 
124. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
1 25. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE. supra note 122, at 20 (noting that the presupposi­
tion of giving someone advice is that the person can think about what she has reason to do). 
1 26. See NAGEL, supra note 2, at 142 (noting that people act and form desires "for 
reasons, good and bad"). 
127. See SCANLON, WHAT WE Owe, supra note 122, at 54-55 (discussing efforts to de­
fend a "desire model" of human behavior by "appeal to the idea of second-order desires"). 
1 28. See icl. at 41 -50 (asserting the fundamentality of reasons, not desires, in motivating 
and justifying conduct). 
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Suppose I see a student suffering acute emotional distress, note 
that I could likely help her at only modest inconvenience to myself, 
and pause to consider what to do. In a case such as this, it is surely 
conceivable that I might consider what course of action would best 
promote my own happiness or satisfaction. But if I would derive hap­
piness or satisfaction from helping the student, it would be because I 
see this as what I ought to do; As Thomas Scanlon has written, " [f]rom 
a first-person point of view, the things that contribute to (one's own) 
well-being are obviously important, but the concept of well-being 
plays little role in explaining why they are important."129 To put the 
point somewhat summarily, we do not typically value goods or activi­
ties, nor do we choose them, because they contribute to our well­
being. Rather, goods and activities contribute to our well-being be­
cause we value them. 130 
But why should I value the act of helping someone in distress, or 
think it one that I ought to do? To respond to this question, I must cite 
reasons for thinking the act choice-worthy. I might say, for example, 
that for anyone to be in great and undeserved distress is objectively 
bad and that a person ought to take steps to relieve great and 
undeserved distress whenever she can do so at only modest inconven­
ience to herself.131 This asserted reason is an impersonal one. It would 
apply to anyone in a similar situation, not just to me.132 
Someone else might disagree with my reasoning. The imagined 
interlocutor might claim that I have no reasons unrelated to what is 
good for me, or she might maintain that my moral obligations are 
broader than I believe and that I have impersonally compelling 
reasons to attempt to relieve distress even when the inconvenience to 
me would be very great.133 In either case, we would have to press the 
inqui.ry further, with each of us testing the other's proffered argu­
ments. In the ensuing discussion, reasons, not utility or well-being, 
would function as the fundamental metric of moral assessment.134 As 
Nagel puts it, " [i]f we think at all, we m ust think of ourselves, indi-
129. lei. at 142. 
130. See id. at 40 (concluding that "we should not take 'desires' to be a special source of 
motivation, independent of our seeing things as reasons"). 
131. Cf. NAGEL, supra note 2, at 144 ("The objective badness of pain, for example, is 
not some mysterious further property that all pains have, but just the fact that there is reason 
for anyone capable of viewing the world objectively·to want it to stop."). 
132. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 122, at 73 (discussing "the universality 
of reason judgments"). 
133. This is the utilitarian view, according to which each person should do whatever 
would maximize overall utility, without any special regard for herself or her personal 
projects. 
134. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 122, at 4 (characterizing "judgments of 
right and wrong as judgments about reason and justification"). 
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vidually and collectively, as submitting to the order of reasons rather 
than creating it."135 
B. Well-Being and Choice-Worthiness 
When the personal and the impersonal standpoints are both 
acknowledged, the notion of well-being is typically linked with the 
personal point of view.136 This linkage is warranted in one important 
respect: the well-being of any particular person is relative, at least in 
part, to her particular goals, values, and interests. 
In discussing personal goals, values, and interests, I cannot pause 
to examine all the diverse kinds of things that we rationally value, the 
diverse ways in which we value them,137 or our diverse reasons for 
doing so.138 Suffice it to say that there are irreducibly many valuable 
goods, including "objects and their properties (such as beauty), 
persons, skills and talents, states of character, actions, accomplish­
ments, activities and pursuits, relationships, and ideals."139 In a short 
hmnan life, none of us can address our attention to everything of 
value, nor can we pursue every valuable activity to the fullest extent. 
The need for choice is endemic to the human condition. 
The diversity of goods and the variety of ways in which we can 
value them underlay my repeated arguments in Part I that it is difficult 
to give a plausible substantive account of well-being that reflects all of 
what everyone might reasonably judge most choice-worthy. For 
example, if well-being is defined as a desirable experiential state, we 
might rationally value freedoms, or opportunities, or challenges more 
than that experiential state. If well-being is defined as preference 
satisfaction, we might value the pursuit of particular goals or ideals 
more than having our preferences satisfied as fully as possible over the 
course of our lives. 
1 35. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST WORD 143 (1997) [hereinafter NAGEL, LAST 
WORD]. Judge Posner appears to dispute this claim when he emphasizes what he takes to be 
intractable moral disagreement as a ground for doubting both the validity of any moral 
theory with objectivist pretensions and the capacity of reason to resolve ultimate claims of 
right. POSNER, supra note 121 ,  at 10, 1 7-29. But Judge Posner acknowledges that 
"[a)djudication is a normative activity," frequently requiring "normative reasoning," see id. 
at ll2-13, and he advances a normative theory - which he calls "pragmatism" - prescrib­
ing the kind of normative reasoning in which judges ought to engage. See id. at 240-65. His 
arguments for pragmatism are framed for reasoned assessment; he assumes the competence 
of reason to assess the validity of both of his claims and those that he debunks. 
1 36. See Scanlon, supra note I ,  at 96 (noting this association in leading accounts). 
1 37. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 122, at 99 ("[U)nderstanding the value 
of something is not just a matter of knowing ltow valuable it is, but rather a matter of know­
ing how to value it."). 
1 38. See id. at 98 (asserting that "[t]here does not seem to be a single, reason-providing 
property that is common to all" valued goods). 
139. Id. at 95. 
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To some, it appears natural and even irresistible to assume that for 
each of us there is a single· highest good - our well-being, or what is 
best for us personally - that a fully informed and rational person 
would always choose.140 But the diversity of goods and the diversity of 
the ways in which we value them render this view implausible. We 
may value certain kinds of music because they make us feel happy, but 
to adapt Bernard Williams's telling ·phrase, ·anyone · who thinks he 
should be a loving spouse for the sake of his own happiness or well­
being has "one thought too many."141 
As I suggested in Part I,142 a fully informed and rational person 
might choose among differently valuable goods or activities on alter­
native bases that resist amalgamation.'43 To cite just two among many 
possible grounds for choice, a rational person might base her decision 
about what profession to pursue, for example, on loosely prudential 
considerations, aiming to achieve the most happiness or greatest sum 
of satisfaction over her life as a whole.144 Or she might pursue a 
normative ideal, opting not for the promise of happiness or even 
satisfactions but for what she deems choice-worthy on moral or aes­
thetic grounds.145 Doing what is adjudged choice-worthy in this sense 
brings no guarantees of satisfaction. The person who chooses to try to 
live like Socrates may end up very dissatisfied indeed, yet still think 
her choice the best one. 
The distinction between prudential concerns and other reasons for 
action grows even more stark when the .impersonal point of view 
intrudes itself. Sometimes I experience the demands generated by the 
impartial point of view -. for example, to render aid to others - as 
requiring me to suffer diminutions in my personal comfort and in the 
quality of my psychological experience.146 Occupying the personal 
140. See, e.g. , BECKER, supra note 25, at 22-23 (equating rationality with behavior that 
maximizes personal utility); BENTHAM, supra note 65, at 100 (asserting that "pleasure is . . .  
the only good"). 
141. BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK 1 8  (1981). 
142. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69, 85-89. 
143. See, e.g. , SEN, COMMODITIES, supra note 45, at 1 3  ("Whether the binary relation of 
choice can possibly be seen as reflecting the person's well-being must depend on the motiva­
tions that underlie choice. There is an enormous difference between choosing tea or coffee 
according to one's taste (and concern for personal well-being), and choosing to join, or not 
to join, a strike, taking note, inter alia, of obligations to others; or working hard or giving to 
charity out of sympathy or commitment." (footnotes omitted)). 
144. See, e.g., HARE, supra note 70, at 105 (characterizing it as a "requirement of 
prudence . . .  that we should always have a dominant or overriding preference now" for the 
satisfaction of our own current and future preferences). 
145. See Sen, Rational Fools, supra note 1 ,  at 329 (discussing "commitment" as a basis 
for choice distinct from personal well-being). 
146. According to Nagel, the master problem of moral and political theory is to find a 
way to reconcile "the inner conflict" experienced by people who simultaneously occupy both 
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point of view, I may feel worse-off, not better-off, after making some 
of the small sacrifices that I sometimes make.147 Yet I believe that I 
have moral reason to make those sacrifices.148 I feel admiration and 
sometimes awe when I note the much larger sacrifices of comfort, 
health, and even life that others sometimes make in order to promote 
such impersonal values as the health, lives, and liberty of strangers.149 
Once the distinction · between prudence and ideals of moral or 
aesthetic choice-worthiness is recognized,150 I believe that two conclu­
sions follow. First, the bare idea of rationality establishes no lexical 
priority among prudential reasons and reasons for action involving 
moral or aesthetic ideals.151 Second, as between these two possible 
bases for choice, the notion of well-being fits better with prudence.152 
To have well-being is to be well ;153 and our interest in being well, both 
physically and psychologically, is precisely what moral and aesthetic 
ideals sometimes demand that we should sacrifice. It would diminish 
moral and intellectual clarity, not enhance it, to insist that a person 
who died trying to save another, or to end an unjust practice, or to 
impersonal and personal standpoints "that is acceptable to everyone in light of the univer­
sality of that conflict." NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 1 14, at 17-18. 
147. This is a contingent psychological claim. I do not mean to deny that fulfilling per­
ceived moral duties is sometimes or perhaps even typically psychologically rewarding. 
1 48. See NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 114, at 85 ("Impartiality pro­
vides quintessentially agent-neutral reasons - reasons to want something independent of 
your point of view."). 
149. Cf. GRIFFIN, supra note 60, at 160 ("It is not that death could never be better than 
dishonour, but rather that it is hard any longer to see the relevant notion of dishonour solely 
under the heading of prudence."). 
1 50. In arguing that a distinction exists between personal goals and projects, on the one 
hand, and the felt dictates of impersonal reason, on the other, I do not mean to deny that the 
border separating the two may blur. Admittedly, some of the goals and · projects most 
fervently embraced from a personal standpoint may involve the well-being of others. It may 
be a personal goal to advance the interests of one's children or colleagues, see, e.g., NAGEL, 
EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 1 14, at 1 09-10 (noting "the special interest people 
take in their relatives, especially their children," and viewing this interest as being in partial 
tension with the dictates of an impersonal standpoint), or, at the extreme, to ensure justice 
- as defined from the impersonal point of view - for a particular group. But blurry edges 
do not collapse the distinction. The impersonal standpoint generates demands, and reasons 
for action, that call for the sacrifice of personal well-being. 
151. See SUMNER, supra note 60, at 1 88-89 (noting that practical reason must resolve 
conflicts between ethical and other values and that "[p]luralism . . .  seems to be the right 
story about practical rationality"); cf. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 508 (7th 
ed. 1907) (asserting that in cases of "conflict between self-interest and duty, practical reason, 
being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side" and that "the conflict 
would have to be decided by the comparative preponderance of one or other of two groups 
of non-rational impulses"). 
152. See GRIFFIN, supra note 60, at 72 ("If we are interested . . .  in the conception of 
well-being needed by moral theory, it seems that it must be the one supplied by the pruden­
tial value theory."). 
153. See SEN, INEQUALITY, supra note 105, at 39 ("The well-being of a person can be 
seen in terms of the quality (the 'well-ness,' as it were) of the person's being."). 
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make the world a safer place was really just pursuing her own well­
being.154 What is more, as I argued in Part I,155 measurements of a 
person's well-being solely by reference to her own ordinal preference 
rankings assumes a conception of well-being under which interper­
sonal comparisons are impossible. 
In view of these considerations, although I do not have a fully 
worked out conception of well-being, I conclude that the best substan­
tive conception will be a loosely prudential one. I shall therefore use 
the term accordingly, in the remainder of this Part, as I attempt to 
sketch the relation between well-being and other values. Roughly 
speaking, when I say "well-being," I shall hereafter mean to refer to a 
sequence of diverse but desirable experiential states, including, but not 
limited to, happiness and satisfaction, over the course of a complete 
life. In these terms, people's well-being is enhanced insofar as they 
experience more desirable experiential states, or a higher average 
level of experiential quality, over their lives. 
I emphasize, however, that when I use the term "well-being" in this 
way, I do not mean to imply that each of us would always regard the 
promotion of our own well-being as the most important or choice­
worthy aim, even for us. In deciding what we have most reason to do, 
all things considered, we sometimes have to weigh our interests in our 
own well-being against other considerations that bear on choice­
worthiness. These include both impersonally defined moral obliga­
tions and personal ideals of the kind of life we think most worth lead­
ing, even when attempting to meet those ideals would render us 
unhappy or otherwise unsatisfied. 
C. Personal Conceptions of Well-Being from the 
Impersonal Point of View 
Because the impersonal point of view does not simply efface the 
personal point of view, among the greatest challenges for moral 
thinking is to achieve a reconciliation or accommodation of the per­
sonal and impersonal standpoints.156 As a psychological matter, few if 
any of us could accept that others' interests, projects, and well-being 
have as m uch claim on us as our own.157 
1 54. See SEN, COMMODITIES, supra note 45, at 1 3  (noting that the equation of well­
being with choice fails to acknowledge crucial differences in motivations for choice). 
1 55. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55. 
156. See NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 1 14, at 15 (terming "conflict" 
between the personal and impersonal standpoints "a further problem for ethical and political 
theory - a new set of data for which a theory must be constructed"). 
157. See id. at 18 (noting that "the special concern with how one's own life goes cannot 
be abolished" and suggesting that moral and political theory must accommodate this psy­
chological reality); cf RAWLS, supra note 96, at 176-78 (observing that principles of justice 
should be selected partly in light of "general facts of moral psychology" indicating that it is 
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According to utilitarian thinkers, when we attempt to occupy an 
impersonal standpoint, what we discover is simply a reason to treat 
others' well-being, as they understand it, as being as important as our 
own.ts!! Kaplow and Shaven advance a very similar claim: legal and 
social policy should be based exclusively on calculations of social wel­
fare, with social welfare defined as a positive, increasing function of 
the well-being of individuals.159 But this formulation is at once too 
broad and too narrow. 
It is too broad because it fails to recognize the inherently moral, 
and thus judgmental, character of the impersonal standpoint. When 
we assume an impersonal point of view, we accept that there are limits 
on what we can reasonably demand of others.16() By the same token, 
we adopt a perspective from which to assess what others can reasona­
bly demand from us, from each other, and from the legal system. To 
some extent , impersonal moral thinking may incorporate the goals and 
interests that we (and others) embrace from a personal standpoint.161 
Nonetheless, there is no reason to assume that impersonal moral 
thinking will simply absorb everyone's goals and interests or make the 
promotion of individual well-being (as I have now loosely defined it) 
its undifferentiated goal. 
If a person is starving or suffering from a physical injury, she can 
reasonably demand that others come to her aid, as long as they can do 
so without too much cost or risk to themselves. From the impersonal 
point of view, her life and her freedom from physical agony possess 
objective value, as do everyone else's. Matters would be different, 
however, if a person wanted help in afflicting others on the basis of 
race or religion, even if such assistance would bring her great psycho­
logical gratification and even if she would prefer help in that cause to 
being given a decent diet. In the case of an antisocial preference such 
as this, it is not merely that others' interests in avoiding affliction 
sometimes difficult or impossible for people not to value their own interests over the good of 
the community). 
158. See SIDGWICK, supra note 15 1 ,  at 492 ("[A] Utilitarian must hold that it is always 
wrong for a man knowingly to do anything other than what he believes to be most conducive 
to Universal Happiness."); WILLIAMS, supra note 141 ,  at 14 ("A man who has . . .  a [central] 
project will be required by Utilitarianism to give up what it requires in a given case just if 
that conflicts with what he is required to do as an impersonal utility-maximizer . . . .  "). See 
generally BARRY, supra note 1 13, at 2 1 7-33 (discussing utilitarianism as an "impartialist" 
theory positing a general obligation to promote the general welfare). 
I 59. See KA PLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 3, at 24 ("[S]ocial welfare is postulated to be 
an increasing function of individuals' well-being and to depend on no other factors."). 
1 60. See NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 1 14, at 37 (noting that 
"[e]ach of us has a primary attachment to his own personal interests, projects, and commit­
ments, but this is restrained by our occupation of the impersonal standpoint . . . .  "). 
161. See id. at 65 (asserting that from the impersonal point of view we "take as our pre­
liminary guide to the value" of what happens to each person "the value which it has from" 
that person's point of view). 
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would carry decisive weight in the moral balance. Even if those 
interests could be put to one side, a personal goal (or even ideal) of 
harming others would exert no morally colorable claim on others' 
time, energy, or resources.162 From an impersonal point of view, some 
personal goals and interests matter more than others, while others 
matter not at all, and not merely because of the extent to which they 
contribute to a person's experienced happiness, satisfaction, or well­
being.163 
The notion that public policy should be based solely on calcula­
tions of well-being is also too narrow. From an impersonal point of 
view, we are not merely sentient creatures, capable of achieving expe­
riential states or having our preferences satisfied; we are moral agents, 
able to develop and pursue independent conceptions of what is good 
and choice-worthy. Partly independent of our well-being are our 
interests in exercising moral powers of valuation and choice. 164 Our 
lives and status are demeaned if we lack opportunities as well as the 
resources to make critical judgments about the kind of people we want 
to be and the kinds of lives we ought to lead, even if our choices make 
us less happy or satisfied than we might otherwise have been.165 This, I 
believe, is the premise underlying the familiar assumption that rights 
of speech and religion, in particular, have some capacity to resist the 
claims of individual well-being and social welfare. We value for 
ourselves, and we owe to others, the basic liberties necessary to 
develop and pursue independent conceptions of choice-worthy lives.166 
I should emphasize that although my stance here reflects what is 
commonly affirmed from a personal standpoint, it also claims to be an 
objective one, grounded in an impersonal point of view, and thus not 
dependent on what most members of any particular society would 
162. Cf T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655, 659-60 (1975) 
[hereinafter Scanlon, Preference and Urgency] (asserting that "[t]he fact that someone would 
be willing to forego a decent diet in order to build a monument to his god does not mean 
that his claim on others for aid in his project has the same strength as a claim for aid in 
obtaining enough to eat (even assuming that the sacrifice required of others would be the 
same)" ). 
1 63. See NAGEL, supra note 2, at 167-71 (so arguing); see also BARRY, supra note 1 13, at 
160-88 (discussing prominently asserted grounds for denying that some values or concep­
tions of the good provide impartial reasons). 
164. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 122, at 105-06 (asserting that "appreci­
ating the value of human life must involv[e] recognizing and respecting" the capacities to 
"select among the various ways there is reason to want a life to go" and "to govern and live 
that life in an active sense"). 
1 65. See Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, Introduction to UTILITARIANISM AND 
BEYOND, supra note 16, at 1, 13  (distinguishing the value of the capacity to choose from the 
value of the thing chosen). 
166. This, roughly, is the idea underlying Rawls's claim that the best measure of social 
justice is the distribution of primary goods, not well-being or utility as each person conceives 
it. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing primary goods). 
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deem choice-worthy.167 Even if all members of some society would 
choose to live like Mill's fools, satisfied, and to stifle free speech in 
service of their aims, freedom of speech would retain its impersonal 
value. As I have noted already, among the reasons that currently 
prevailing preferences cannot by themselves establish what is right is 
that, from an impersonal point of view, the interests of unborn 
generations also count.168 Because the existence of unborn generations 
is contingent, so are their utility functions. Predictions might be 
possible, but more is at stake. Even if (as is imaginable) people 
brought up without freedom of speech would value it less than people 
born into a free society, and even if the current generation would 
prefer to limit or abandon freedom of speech, the living would owe 
freedom of speech to those who will come after, to enable them to 
form their own, informed, independent ideals.169 
In claims such as this, Kaplow and Shaven believe they catch the 
scent of moral elitism and potential tyranny.170 But tyranny by the 
majority, or by social utility functions, is as conceptually possible as 
tyranny by self-styled moral elites. Recall my argument in Part 1171 that 
the maximization of certain substantive conceptions of well-being, 
such as happiness or preference satisfaction, could imaginably produce 
outcomes that literally no one would choose.172 In principle, Kaplow 
and Shaven are as open to charges of potential tyranny as those 
against whom they lodge the accusation.173 The charges are empty in 
167. The relevant sense of objectivity may be either stronger or weaker. Cf. Scanlon, 
Preference and Urgency, supra note 162, at 658 (defining "an objective criterion" as one 
"that provides a basis for appraisal of a person's level of well-being which is independent of 
that person's tastes and interests" even if the criterion is "socially relative"). 
168. See generally PARFIT, supra note 61, at 351-441 (discussing myriad problems 
presented in attempting to fit unborn generations into an acceptable moral framework). 
1 69. I do not mean to suggest that the formation of ideals could ever be entirely uncon­
ditioned. See NAGEL, supra note 2, at 119 (arguing that critical reflection can never wholly 
transcend "the unchosen sources of our most autonomous efforts" and that the critical per­
spective that "seems to offer greater control also reveals the ultimate givenness of the self'). 
The "ultimate givenness of the self' does not make autonomy a nonsensical ideal, but it does 
suggest that "autonomy" - insofar as the concept is used in a descriptive sense - "is a 
matter of degree." Fallon, Two Senses, supra note 49, at 877. 
1 70. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 421 -22 ("The idea of an analyst substi­
tuting his or her own conception of what individuals should value for the actual views of the 
individuals themselves conflicts with individuals' basic autonomy and freedom."). 
17 1 .  See supra text accompanying notes 92-93. 
172. See generally Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Interpersonal Comparisons, 
in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS, supra note 53, at 1 7, 43 (developing a similar criticism of 
an approach under which policies should be based on people's hypothetical "fully informed" 
references). 
173. See Joseph William Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 103, 125 (2002) (asserting that Kaplow and Shavell's approach would "impose . . .  
rules on people against their wishes on the ground that, if people thought it through, this is 
what they would want"). 
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both cases, however, until supplied with a substantive foundation in 
moral argument. The identification of tyranny requires a moral 
baseline, and to establish a moral baseline takes moral argument. 
Simply to note the views, preferences, or utility functions of the 
majority proves nothing.174 
I have maintained that moral premises emerge directly from an 
impersonal point of view that each of us is capable of adopting. This is 
admittedly a contestable claim. As should now be clear, however, it is 
not a claim that Kaplow and Shavell can reject,. at least when put in 
general terms: they too rely on an analogue of the impersonal point of 
view, as suggested by their appeals to what rational parties would 
choose ex ante.175 They differ from me not in denying that there is a 
distinctively moral perspective, characterized by its impartiality, but in 
their assessment of what emerges from that perspective. According to 
them, the premise emerges that the sole and ultimate moral good lies 
in the promotion of the general welfare, as defined by currently pre­
vailing tastes or preferences.176 l have argued that other values matter 
too. 
174. See, e.g., Harsanyi, supra note 16, at 61 (acknowledging that "the concept of ration­
ality alone" will not "yield a useful ethical theory" in the absence of "a commitment to a 
humanitarian morality"). 
Mill once argued that the moral significance of the general well-being followed as a con­
sequence of each person's nonmoral desire for her own well-being: "[E]ach person's happi­
ness is a good to that �rson, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate 
of all persons." MILL, supra note 65, at 33. But this reasoning is fallacious. As Sidgwick 
objected, "an aggregate of actual desires, each directed towards a different part of the gen­
eral happiness, does not constitute an actual desire for the general happiness, existing in any 
individual." SIDGWJCK, supra note 151, at 388. 
On the surface, it might appear that some contractualist moral theories attempt to derive 
morality from principles of purely rational, self-interested choice. See, e.g., DAVID 
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 9 (1984) (attempting to derive morality from "the 
application of the maximizing conception of rationality to certain structures of interaction" 
by arguing that " [a]greed mutual constraint is the rational response to these structures"); 
RAWLS, supra note 96, at 12-14 (defining justice by reference to principles that would be 
chosen by "rational and mutually disinterested" parties, "conceived as not taking an interest 
in one another's interests," and with their rationality "interpreted as far as possible in the 
narrow sense. standard in economic theory"). But for unanimous, self-interested agreement 
on principles of justice to be even plausibly attainable, fair or ideal choice conditions need to 
be specified. There is no way to generate those conditions without reliance on morally 
shaped notions of fairness or reasonableness. See NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, 
supra note 114, at 39 (observing that what a party to a hypothetical contracting situation 
could reasonably reject as insufficiently responsive to her own goals or interests is "a moral 
issue 'all the way down' "). 
175. See KA PLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 3, at 442 ("We do not see a persuasive 
affirmative argument for an ex post view that would trump policies that maximize individu­
als' well-being ex ante - policies that have in fact received individuals' consent or that 
would receive it [in an ex ante bargaining situation)."). 
176. See id. at 26 ("[T]o adopt welfare economics is to adopt the general moral position 
that one should be concerned, positively and exclusively, with individuals' well-being."). 
Kaplow and Shavell assert that there is an affinity between their arguments criticizing 
fairness theories and the critical arguments offered by Judge Posner, see POSNER, supra note 
121, debunking the pretensions of what he calls "moral theory." But if Judge Posner's argu­
ments were valid, they would tell equally against the moral theory offered by Kaplow and 
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D. Rights 
Within the account that I have offered, the point of rights - in 
morals and to some extent in constitutional law - is to protect or 
promote goods and opportunities that, from an impersonal standpoint, 
are adjudged valuable and that are needful of protection or promo­
tion. As Scanlon once wrote, to be persuasive a claim of moral right 
must generally be backed by (i) "an empirical claim about how indi­
viduals would behave or how institutions would work in the absence of 
this particular assignment of rights," (ii) a value-based claim that "this 
result would be unacceptable," and (iii) a further empirical claim 
about how "the envisaged assignment of rights will produce a differ­
ent" and better outcome.177 
Attempts to derive constitutional rights commonly proceed on a 
similar basis. As I have argued elsewhere,178 our constitutional practice 
pervasively presupposes that rights reflect "interests," with the term 
"interests" representing those personal values that retain their impor­
tance from an impersonal standpoint. To provide only the sketchiest 
illustration, First Amendment analysis often presupposes that people 
have interests in being able to express themselves and in having access 
to information and ideas.179 In some cases, however, other interests 
may weigh on the other side. If Jones wants to express herself to Smith 
by picketing outside Smith's home, interests in privacy must also be 
taken into account. 180 
The balancing of competing considerations need not occur on a 
case-by-case basis. We frequently get better consequences overall by 
laying down clear rules and abiding by them.181 For example, we might 
Shavell, which maintains that welfare economics supplies the uniquely morally correct an­
swers to questions of social justice. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 5 
("[A]dvocating the exclusive use of welfare economics, as we do, is equivalent to adopting 
the moral position that the design of the legal system should be based solely on concerns for 
human welfare."). 
1 77. T.M. Scanlon, Rights, Goals, and Fairness, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 43, 
103 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1 978). Scanlon appears subsequently to have changed his view. 
See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 122, at 106-07 (maintaining that considerations 
of right and wrong should play "a more fundamental role" in defining what we owe to each 
other than they are permitted to play by "consequentialism, according to which ideas of 
right, wrong, and obligation are made subservient to a purely teleological conception of the 
good"). 
1 78. See Fallon, supra note 10. 
1 79. See icl. at 372 (noting the role of such interests in supporting the conclusion that flag 
burning is protected speech). 
1 80. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474. 484 (1988) (upholding an ordinance barring tar­
geted picketing of homes in light of "[t]he state's interest in protecting the well-being, tran­
quility, and privacy of the home"). 
1 8 1 .  See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 135-66 (1991 ) 
(exploring the reasons for reliance on rules). 
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conclude that criticism of governmental policies should never be pro­
hibitable on the basis of content unless it expressly advocates immi­
nent violence and is likely to produce imminent violence,182 even 
though some criticisms of · the government that receive protection 
under this rule may produce very harmful results. In some uses of the 
term, to say that someone has a "right" means that she enjoys the pro­
tection of a constitutional rule.183 
It perhaps bears emphasis that welfare economics, as championed 
by Kaplow and Shaven, does not preclude the possibility of either 
moral or constitutional rights, based on a calculation of likely conse­
quences. But Kaplow and Shaven would restrict the consequences that 
matter to those involving individual well-being.184 As I have argued 
repeatedly now, that focus is too narrow. Also important are conse­
quences affecting opportunities to form, affirm, and pursue personal 
conceptions of choice-worthiness. 
This is a normative claim, but it also accords with my understand­
ing of important elements of constitutional law. Among the panoply of 
constitutional rights, some are best understood as protecting interests 
in well-being. The Eighth Amendment prohibitions against "excessive 
bail" and "excessive fines" provide examples.185 But others, such as the 
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and religion, should be 
and frequently are interpreted as reflecting partly independent 
interests in being able to develop, affirm, and pursue a personal vision 
of what is choice-worthy.186 To be sure, rights to freedom of speech 
and religion probably tend to promote happiness and preference 
satisfaction in most contexts. But rights such as these should be viewed 
as resting on less contingent normative foundations than appeals to 
social utility. 
182. Cf Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U:S. 444, 447 ( 1969) (holding that "the constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advo­
cacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting 
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action" 
{footnote omitted)). 
183. Compare Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Struclllre of 
American Constillltional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1 ,  13-39 (1998) (claiming that all or nearly 
all constitutional rights are rights against rules), with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and 
Facial Challenges am/ Third-Party Standing, 1 13 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1 365-66 (2000) 
(arguing that although many constitutional rights are rights against rules, not all rights fit this 
framework). 
184. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 5 n.8 ("Welfare economics . . .  is a par­
ticular species of consequentialism, for it is based (exclusively) on a particular set of conse­
quences, namely. those that bear on individuals' well-being."). 
1 85. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed . . . .  "). 
· 
186. See Fallon, Two Senses, supra note 49. at 902-03; cf NAGEL, EQUALITY AND 
PARTIALITY, supra note 114, at 141 ("Rights to freedom of expression are strongly 
supported by their consequences for political accountability and the growth of knowledge. as 
well as by considerations of individual autonomy."). 
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I should emphasize that my view about the appropriate definition 
of rights, which I believe to be reflected in constitutional law, is 
ethically pluralist.187 It does not insist that interests in developing an 
independent vision of choice-worthiness, or any other value, should 
always prevail over individual well-being and social welfare. It main­
tains only that there are values not reducible to well-being that are 
sometimes more important. 
E. A Note on Moral Methodology 
In upholding ethical pluralism and arguing that some moral and 
constitutional rights should be recognized for reasons other than the 
promotion of well-being, I have not only invoked the loosely defined 
notion of an impersonal point of view; I have repeatedly cited my own 
judgments about what that hypothesized point of view reveals, and I 
have appealed to moral convictions that I expect to be widely shared. 
In Welfare Versus Fairness, Kaplow and Shaven rightly call attention 
to the inherent difficulty in this mode of reasoning. Debunking the 
appeals to moral intuition made by fairness theorists, they assert that 
moral intuitions are too much the product of social conditioning to 
support rigorous, noncircular analysis. 188 
The problem is a deep one, but not one that Kaplow and Shavell 
can escape any more than fairness theorists can. If moral argument 
cannot begin with appeals to moral intuition or conviction, how else 
might it begin?189 In defending their own view, Kaplow and Shaven 
rely pervasively on such appeals. They appeal to the intuition that 
human well-being has normative significance.190 They also draw on a 
second, related intuition that any principle that reduces everyone's 
well-being deserves to be rejected.191 
Methodologically, Kaplow and Shaven appear to believe that 
although moral argument may need to start with intuitive or other 
1 87. See generally ANDERSON, supra note 86. at 1 4-15 (sketching a "socially grounded, 
ideal-based. pluralistic theory of value"); ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 167-72 
( 1 969) (defending value pluralism); SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 122, at 143 
(maintaining that "the values that properly guide us remain plural"). 
188. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 3, at 71-76 (criticizing philosophers who rely 
on intuitions as bases for moral analysis). 
189. Cf NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 1 14, at 7 (asserting that "the 
use of moral intuition is inevitable, and should not be regretted," in reflective moral reason­
ing, and that "[t]o trust our intuitions, particularly those that tell us something is wrong . . .  
we need only believe that our moral understanding extends farther than our capacity to spell 
out the principles that underlie it"). 
1 90. They characterize this as a "value judgment" that is implicit in the welfare eco­
nomic framework. See KA PLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 3, at 25. 
1 91 .  See hi. at xviii-xix ("Most individuals - including many of the philosophers we 
have queried - would not readily endorse a principle of fairness if doing so implies (as it 
does) that it may be deemed socially good to make everyone worse off."). 
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precritical judgments, it should not stop there.192 Further, critical, 
systematizing reflection must occur, to test which precritical 
judgments survive and which do not.193 I agree with this general ap­
proach. I partly disagree about its application. 
According to Kaplow and Shavell, most intuitive moral judgments 
reflect "social norms" or norms of behavior into which children are 
commonly socialized.194 Social norms have evolved, they say, to 
promote two goals: "to reduce opportunistic behavior toward others 
and to help us best advance our interests."195 These two goals can be 
subsumed, they write, under the more fundamental conclusion that the 
"raison d'etre for social norms" and moral intuitions, which should 
therefore be the touchstone of systematic moral thinking, "is to pro­
mote individuals' well-being."196 
This argument is unpersuasive. To begin with, the two asserted 
goals of social norms - "to reduce opportunistic behavior toward 
others and to help us best advance our interests" - can pull in 
opposite directions. In some cases, behaving opportunistically might 
be the best way for any particular person to adv'ance her own interests. 
It is far from obvious how these sometimes divergent desiderata 
conjoin as elements of a master aim of "promot[ing] individuals' well­
being," especially insofar as Kaplow and Shavell leave the concept of 
well-being substantially undefined. 
A second objection is more fundamental. Even if most intuitive 
moral judgments did trace to social norms that were functionally 
adapted to the promotion of individual and social well-being (as 
somehow defined), the question would remain: But should well-being 
be the exclusive concern of private moral deliberation and public 
decisionmaking? Cultural history and evolutionary biology cannot 
answer this question.197 An answer can only be sought through moral 
inquiry, conducted before the tribunal of reason. We need to examine 
1 92 See id. at 73-74 & n.108 {distinguishing "the direct use of particular intuitions or 
instincts about the fairness of particular acts or rules from the systematic study of a wide 
range of such intuitions for the purposes of critically assessing them and thereby attempting 
to identify what principle or principles underlie them"). 
1 93. See id. at 72 n.108 ("Unless we believe our instincts and intuitions to have been 
implanted through an infallible (perhaps divine) mechanism, we must inquire into their 
possible origins and functions in order to assess what weight, if any, we should give them as 
evaluative principles."). 
1 94. See id. at 62 {"We submit that there is often a correspondence - indeed, 
sometimes an identity - between notions of fairness that are used as independent principles 
for the evaluation of legal rules and various social norms that guide ordinary individuals in 
their everyday lives."). 
195. Id. at 71.  
1 96. Id. 
197. See NAGEL, LAST WORD, supra note 135, at 105-06 (observing that appeals to con­
vention, cultural practice, or social background cannot resolve ultimate normative ques­
tions). 
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whether we have most reason to try to base all legal rules and moral 
precepts on calculations of individual well-being, as somehow defined, 
or whether other considerations · also matter. 
Kaplow and Shavell have provided their reasons for thinking that 
all legal judgments should be based exclusively on considerations of 
individual well-being. I have criticized their arguments and now, in 
admittedly sketchier terms, have provided reasons for adopting a dif­
ferent framework, capable of supporting rights against welfare, as well 
as rights that are based on welfare. 
CONCLUSION 
. As Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have emphasized, a moral or 
legal theory that relies on considerations other than well-being risks 
diminishing the well-being of literally everyone. They believe that 
theorists who value considerations other than well-being should be 
deeply disconcerted by this largely tautological observation (that 
theories that do not set out exclusively to promote well-being may 
sometimes diminish well-being, imaginably including the well-being of 
literally everyone, at least in far-fetched cases198). According to Kap­
low and Shavell, reflection on this hazard should lead all legal analysts 
to embrace a form of welfare economics. 
In assessing the argument advanced by Kaplow and Shave)) to 
make well-being the exclusive concern of legal policy analysis, I have 
argued that it matters enormously how well-being is defined. Under 
what I have called an ordinal conception, each person's well-being is 
measured on a scale comprising that person's own ranked preferences 
among states of affairs. Her well-being is increased or diminished as 
she moves up or down that ranked list, regardless of the basis for her 
rankings. In criticizing "fairness" theories, Kaplow and Shavell em­
phasize such theories' capacity to diminish well-being as measured by 
the affected people's ordinal scales. Significantly, however, the welfare 
economic approach endorsed by Kaplow and Shaven cannot employ a 
purely ordinal conception of well-being. According to Kaplow and 
Shavell, welfare economics requires interpersonal comparisons of 
utility; analysts need to assess whether and when increases in the well­
being of some are sufficiently large to justify diminutions in the well­
being of others. For interpersonal comparisons to be possible, 
however, well-being must be specified in terms of a uniform substan­
tive metric such as happiness or preference satisfaction. 
198. See KA PLOW & SHA YELL. supra note 3. at 58 ("[I]t is virtually a tautology to assert 
that fairness-based evaluation entails some sort of reduction in individuals' well-being, for 
notions of fairness are principles of evaluation that give weight to factors unrelated to indi­
viduals' well-being."). 
February 2003) Welfare Economics 1025 
As soon as well-being is given a substantive definition, however, 
then a person's well-being can no longer be definitionally equated 
with what she necessarily values most or would choose for herself as 
reflected by her ordinal preference scale. If, for example, well-being 
were defined as preference satisfaction or as happiness, then people 
might value freedom of speech and religion more than marginal 
increments of well-being. (Better Socrates dissatisfied than a fool sat­
isfied.) Indeed, it becomes imaginable that the well-being maximizing 
rule (if well-being were thus defined) might sometimes be one that 
literally no one would choose. 
This is a point of fundamental importance in ·the evaluation of 
Kaplow and Shavell's argument: their own preferred welfare economic 
methodology is vulnerable to the same c:ijticism that they think 
qevastates fairness theories. Their version of welfare economics might 
dictate legal rules that would increase well-being as defined by an 
analyst's chosen substantive measure, but that no one would choose 




Recognition of the potential gap between substantive conceptions 
of well-being and what a person might rationally choose reveals the 
need for careful reflection on the relation of well-being to other 
values. In contrast with Kaplow and Shavell's argument that well­
being is the architectonic value of values, I have maintained that well­
being is more perspicuously defined in less imperialistic terms. As I 
would define it, well-being is an important prudential value, involving 
a sequence of diverse but desirable experiential states over the course 
of a complete life, but it is not necessarily the exclusive rational aim. 
From a personal point of view, we may value ideals more than our 
own well-being. Nor is well-being all that matters when we assume an 
impersonal moral perspective. We value diverse goods in diver�e ways 
and recognize morally various obligations and constraints. Choice­
worthiness is a concept distinct from well-being. 
Just as well-being is not necessarily all that people value, nor what 
they would always choose for themselves, neither should it function as 
the exclusive concern in the design of legal rules. Whereas our reasons 
to value our own well-being are prudential , decisions about the 
content of legal rules should be moral ones, reflecting impartial judg­
ments of what we owe to each other and what a political community 
owes to its citizens. From an impartial perspective, individual well­
being matters, but other considerations are also pertinent. Crucial 
among these, I have argued, are individual choice and the background 
conditions necessary for autonomous judgment. When well-being is 
distinguished from choice-worthiness, and opportunities for autono­
mous choice are seen to have a value independent of what is chosen, 
grounds emerge for the recognition of rights against welfare. 
